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Abstract
In R v Sharpe, the Supreme Court of Canada read in a “private use exception” to the offence of possessing
child pornography. The Court reasoned that youths’ self-created expressive material and private
recordings of lawful sexual activity—created by, or depicting the accused and held by the accused
exclusively for private use—would pose little or no risk to children and may in fact be of significance to
adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization, sexual exploration, and identity. Fundamental changes in the
technological, social, sexual, and legal landscape since Sharpe have resulted in a lack of clarity regarding
the exception’s scope. Federal and provincial police and federally funded child protection agencies now
regularly inform young people that they do not have the legal right to consensually create and share their
digital sexual images with an intimate partner. Scholarly opinion on the exception’s application to teenage
sexting is under-considered and varied, and subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception have
extended the boundaries of private use while also circumscribing the protection by requiring youth to
retain the ability to “maintain control” of their images. Via a mapping of our new technological and legal
landscape, as well as a consideration of shifting privacy, communication, and sexual norms, this article
examines and clarifies the application of the private use exception to teenagers’ contemporary digital
sexual expression practices. This article argues that the private use exception as set out in Sharpe is
inclusive of consensual teenage sexting in private yet is too narrow to adequately protect the sexual
speech of teens. While subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception have extended the boundaries
of private use, these analyses have also potentially and paradoxically circumscribed the protection by
requiring youth to retain the ability to “maintain control” their own images. A key goal of this article is thus
to interrogate the relationship between privacy and control as it relates to youths’ consensual sexual
expression. Finally, this article argues that future considerations of the parameters of the private use
exception incorporate an analysis of the benefits of sexual expression for young people as well as a
positive sexual rights framework that recognizes the autonomy of youth who are of legal age to consent
to sexual relations.
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In R v Sharpe, the Supreme Court of Canada read in a “private use exception” to the offence
of possessing child pornography. The Court reasoned that youths’ self-created expressive
material and private recordings of lawful sexual activity—created by, or depicting the accused
and held by the accused exclusively for private use—would pose little or no risk to children
and may in fact be of significance to adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization, sexual
exploration, and identity. Fundamental changes in the technological, social, sexual, and legal
landscape since Sharpe have resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the exception’s scope.
Federal and provincial police and federally funded child protection agencies now regularly
inform young people that they do not have the legal right to consensually create and share
their digital sexual images with an intimate partner. Scholarly opinion on the exception’s
application to teenage sexting is under-considered and varied, and subsequent judicial
interpretations of the exception have extended the boundaries of private use while also
circumscribing the protection by requiring youth to retain the ability to “maintain control”
of their images. Via a mapping of our new technological and legal landscape, as well as a
consideration of shifting privacy, communication, and sexual norms, this article examines
and clarifies the application of the private use exception to teenagers’ contemporary digital
sexual expression practices. This article argues that the private use exception as set out in
Sharpe is inclusive of consensual teenage sexting in private yet is too narrow to adequately
protect the sexual speech of teens. While subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception
have extended the boundaries of private use, these analyses have also potentially and
paradoxically circumscribed the protection by requiring youth to retain the ability to “maintain
control” their own images. A key goal of this article is thus to interrogate the relationship
between privacy and control as it relates to youths’ consensual sexual expression. Finally,
this article argues that future considerations of the parameters of the private use exception
incorporate an analysis of the benefits of sexual expression for young people as well as a
positive sexual rights framework that recognizes the autonomy of youth who are of legal age
to consent to sexual relations.

IN 1995, CANADA CUSTOMS AGENTS stopped Robin Sharpe—a middle-aged, gay,

retired city planner—and seized from his luggage his self-authored text entitled
“Boyabuse—Flogging, Fun and Fortitude: A Collection of Kiddiekink Classics.”
Sharpe was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography.1 The
following year, police laid more charges after searching Sharpe’s residence and
1.

R v Sharpe (1999), 169 DLR (4th) 536 at para 3 [Sharpe BCSC]; R v Sharpe, 1999 175
DLR (4th) 1 (BCCA) [Sharpe BCCA]; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 163.1. Child
pornography is defined in s 163.1(1):
163.1 (1) In this section, “child pornography” means
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was made by
electronic or mechanical means,
		(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years
and engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or
		
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose,
of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen years;
(b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or counsels
sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence
under this Act;
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seizing his private and unpublished stories, as well as 10 photographs of what
Sharpe described as “two nude blond boys in their late teens, gay lovers at the
time, hugging, kissing and hamming it up for the camera.”2
Facing the stigma of being labelled a child pornographer, and vaguely aware
of the criticisms that followed the then newly created child pornography laws,
Sharpe decided to challenge the constitutionality of the definition of child
pornography and the simple possession provision set out in s. 163.1 of the Code.3
In 1999, both the British Columbia Supreme Court and the British Columbia
Court of Appeal agreed with Sharpe, in part, and struck down the possession
provision as a violation of his right to freedom of expression.4 In 2001, the
Supreme Court of Canada similarly determined that criminalizing the possession
of child pornography infringed on Sharpe’s right to freedom of expression, but
held that this infringement was nevertheless justified under section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because of the need to protect children
from harm.5 Having determined this, however, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin,
writing on behalf of the majority, also acknowledged that the prohibition
“captures in its sweep materials that arguably pose little or no risk to children,
and that deeply implicate the freedoms [of expression] guaranteed under s.
2(b).”6 To address this over-breadth and to maintain the constitutionality of our
child pornography laws, the Court “read in” a “private use exception” to the
offences of making and possessing child pornography.7 This private use exception
would apply to two classes of materials: “(1) Self-created expressive material: i.e.,
any written material or visual representation created by the accused alone, and

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

(c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual
purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an
offence under this Act; or
(d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, presentation
or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of
eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act.
Ibid at paras 3-4; Robin Sharpe “R vs. Sharpe Personal Account”, online: <robinsharpe.ca/
rvssharpe1.html>.
Sharpe BCCA, supra note 1 at paras 3-5.
Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1 at para 83; Sharpe BCCA, supra note 1 at paras 215-18.
R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 [Sharpe]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter].
Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 105. See also ibid at para 120.
Ibid at paras 114–20. In 2008, then Chief Justice McLachlin clarified that “the effect of
granting a constitutional exemption would be to so change the legislation as to create
something different in nature from what Parliament intended” (R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC
6 at para 50).
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held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or her own personal use; and
(2) Private recordings of lawful sexual activity: i.e., any visual recording, created
by or depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity
and is held by the accused exclusively for private use.”8 The Court elaborated
further and wrote: “[F]or example, a teenage couple would not fall within the
law’s purview for creating and keeping sexually explicit pictures featuring each
other alone, or together engaged in lawful sexual activity, provided these pictures
were created together and shared only with one another.”9 The Court reasoned
that not only would these materials “pose little or no risk to children,” but they
also “may be of significance to adolescent self-fulfillment, self-actualization and
sexual exploration and identity.”10
Much has changed in the technological, social, and legal landscape since
Sharpe was originally decided. As has been the case historically, technological
developments have contributed significantly to shifts in communication, privacy,
and sexual norms.11 With increasing access and affordability, camera-equipped
smartphones, social networking, and an expanded digital realm have
fundamentally changed how, where, and the extent to which adolescents and
adults maintain friendships, flirt, hook up, date, have sex, break up, and generally
communicate with one another.12 While self-produced and distributed sexual
images are by no means a new practice, the ease, amount, scope, purpose, and,

8.

Ibid at para 128. The use of “i.e.” in both instances indicates that these examples are not
necessarily exhaustive.
9. Ibid at para 116.
10. Ibid at para 109. Outcry following the Sharpe decision resulted in reforms to our child
pornography laws—including the addition of our current transmission, exporting and
accessing offences, as well as changes to the available defences. See Sara M Smyth, “A
‘Reasoned Apprehension’ of Overbreadth: An Alternative Approach to the Problems
Presented by Section 63.1 of the Criminal Code” (2009) 42 UBC L Rev 69 at 87-89.
11. For the purposes of this article, digital technology and communication technology are used
interchangeably.
12. Amanda Lenhart, Monica Anderson & Aaron Smith, “Teens, Technology and Romantic
Relationships” Pew Research Centre (1 October 2015), online: <www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2015/10/01/teens-technology-and-romantic-relationships>; Amanda Lenhart
& Maeve Duggan, “Couples, the Internet, and Social Media: How American Couples
Use Digital Technology to Manage Life, Logistics and Emotional Intimacy within Their
Relationships” Pew Research Centre (11 February 2014), online: <https://www.pewresearch.
org/internet/2014/02/11/couples-the-internet-and-social-media/>; McAfee, “Study Reveals
Majority of Adults Share Intimate Details via Unsecured Digital Devices” (4 February 2014),
online: McAfee <http://www.mcafee.com/ca/about/news/2014/q1/20140204-01.aspx>.
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to some extent, the meaning of sexual pictures created and shared by those under
the age of eighteen has changed in the digital age.13
The goal of this article is to examine the application of the private use
exception to digital communication practices and products—specifically,
to teenagers’ “sexts” that comprise nude, semi-nude, or sexually explicit images,
videos, and text messages consensually created and shared by youth under the age
of eighteen via cellular and wireless networks.14 At the time that the private use
exception was drafted, the Court likely envisioned two teens, together physically
in a defined offline context—such as a bedroom or other private space—using a
recording device such as a camera or camcorder. In our digital context however—
with the development of camera-equipped smartphones, messaging applications,
and wireless networking—proximity, physical sexual contact, and celluloid are
no longer conceptualized as necessary for teens (or adults) to “participate in the
sexual activity” or to “create [images] together.”15 Indeed, a growing body of
research demonstrates that young people experience the creation and sharing of
nudes as flirting and foreplay, and many teens as well as adults are choosing to
sext instead of engaging in, or in combination with, offline sexual relations.16
In this digital context, two teens whose texts to one another become increasingly
flirtatious and, at some point, involve the creation and digital sharing of nude
images are, arguably, both participating in the sexual activity in question.17
The Court in R v Sharpe makes it clear that the exclusion for private recordings
of unlawful sexual activity applies to the making and possessing of such material
13. Digital is used in this article “to emphasise that our lives are inextricably linked with
interactive, networked, remixable and ubiquitous media.” Sonia Livingstone, “Why
label our time and life digital?” (26 May, 2015), LSE Department of Media and
Communications (blog), online: <blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digitalfuture/2015/05/26/
why-label-our-time-and-life-digital>.
14. “Sext” is used interchangeably with “nude image” “nude” or “intimate image”. This article
also considers non-consensual distribution of consensual sexts given that, as is argued below,
the teasing apart of consensual and non-consensual distribution is more complex than is
often acknowledged.
15. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 116.
16. Terri Day, “The New Digital Dating Behavior—Sexting: Teens’ Explicit Love Letters:
Criminal Justice or Civil Liability” (2010) 33 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 69; Julie Cupples
& Lee Tompson, “Heterotextuality and Digital Foreplay: Cell Phones and the Culture of
Teenage Romance” (2010) 10 Feminist Media Studies 1; British Pregnancy Advisory Service,
“Social Media, SRE, and Sensible Drinking: Understanding the Dramatic Decline in Teenage
Pregnancy” (May 2018), online: <http://www.bpas.org>.
17. Indeed, the exception, if read narrowly, may actually require physical proximity and sexual
contact in order for youths’ sexual expression to be deemed significant sexual exploration or
important for their self-actualization and identity.
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but not to its publication or distribution.18 That is, the private use exception will
not apply to any material that is transferred to a person other than its creator
or a participant in its creation.19 However, subsequent interpretations of the
exception expand the definition of “participant” and recognize the role of “digital
sharing” in our contemporary cultural and technological context, thus effectively
extending the exception to include the “transmission” or “distribution” of child
pornography.20 While successive courts have considered the scope of the private
use exception, none have directly considered the consensual teenage sexting
scenario.21 As Karaian has argued elsewhere, this is likely due, in part, to police
and prosecutorial discretion and constraint.22 Nevertheless, scholarly opinion
on the exception’s application to this practice is under-considered and varied.
Whereas Lara Karaian and Andrea Slane have both argued that youths’ digital
sexual expression is captured by the exception,23 others have suggested that the
exception would arguably not apply to sexts that are shared with a remote partner
“because the recipient neither participated in the creation of, nor is depicted in,
the recording,” therefore disqualifying the images and the young people from
inclusion.24 Moreover, lack of clarity regarding the exception’s application to
sexts has resulted in confusion about young peoples’ constitutionally protected
expressive rights.25 Since 2005, federal and provincial police and federally funded
child protection agencies have been informing young people that they do not
have the legal right to consensually create and share digital sexual images with an
intimate partner and that doing so could result in child pornography charges.26
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

25.
26.

Sharpe, supra note 5 at paras 116-118.
Ibid at paras 116, 118.
R v Keough, 2011 ABQB 312.
One exception is R v Schultz, 2008 ABQB 679 at para 129, wherein Justice Topolniski drew
on a hypothetical and argued that the private use defence would not apply to a teenage
female who took explicit photographs and shared them with others via the Internet.
Lara Karaian, “Policing Sexting: Responsibilization, Respectability, and Sexual Subjectivity
in Child Protection/Crime Prevention Responses to Teenagers’ Digital Sexual Expression”
(2014) 18 Theoretical Criminology 282.
Ibid; Lara Karaian, “Lolita Speaks: ‘Sexting,’ Teenage Girls and the Law” (2012) 8 Crime,
Media, Culture 57; Lara Karaian & Katherine van Meyl, “Reframing Risqué/Risky: Queer
Temporalities, Teenage Sexting, and Freedom of Expression Laws” (2015) 4 Laws 18; Andrea
Slane, “Sexting and the Law in Canada” (2013) 22 Can J Hum Sexuality 117.
Joshua Sealy-Harrington & Ashton Menuz, “Keep It to Yourself: The
Private Use Exception for Child Pornography Offences” ABlawg.
ca (23 June 2015), online: <https://ablawg.ca/2015/06/23/
keep-it-to-yourself-the-private-use-exception-for-child-pornography-offences/>.
For the purposes of this article, young people—those between the ages of twelve and
eighteen—are referred to interchangeably with youth, adolescents, and teens.
Karaian, supra note 22 at 282.
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One such example is the Saint-Jérôme Police Service, which was awarded the
2017 Minister of Justice National Youth Justice Policing Award for its anti-sexting
campaign: “Campagne sexton: reflète la bonne image de toi et pas obligé de tout
partager.”27 Consensual sexting in this campaign is framed as self-exploitation
and illegal.28 This project has established a strong media presence, including a
commercial on the dangers of ‘sexting’ which has appeared over a thousand times
at the Saint-Jérôme cinema. The project was also featured on the front pages of
three local papers as well as in television and radio interviews.29 The effects of
this activity on adolescents’ sexual expression, and the damaging effects of this
policing for young peoples’ self-fulfillment, self-actualization, sexual exploration,
and identity have yet to be adequately considered.
This article argues that the private use exception as set out in Sharpe is inclusive
of consensual teenage sexting based on four grounds: the text and spirit of the
exception; subsequent judicial interpretations of the exception; fundamental shifts
in the technological and sexual terrain since the exception was established; and,
recent material amendments to the Criminal Code—namely, the development in
2015 of the Protecting Canadian’s from Online Crime Act (Online Crime Act) and
its new intimate images provision, which makes non-consensual intimate image
distribution a criminal privacy offence.30 Having said this, this article also argues
that the private use exception as it currently exists is too narrow to adequately
27. Department of Justice, “Minister of Justice National Youth Justice Policing Award”
Government of Canada, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/yj-jj/nyjpa-pnmjj/2017.html>.
28. Ibid. This collaborative campaign (which also included the Canadian Centre for Child
Protection, youth prosecutors in the province of Québec, and the Commission scolaire
de la Rivière-du-Nord) disseminated its message via a “Sexto intervention kit for schools,”
which, according to the Department of Justice press release, has reached over 10,000
students since 2016.
29. Ibid. School resource officers across Canada have identified teenage sexting as a major
part of their current work. Royal Canadian Mounted Police and provincial police have
self-produced anti-sexting initiatives that disseminate this message across a variety of
platforms. See also “Un Sexto, C’est Quoi?” Ville de Saint-Jérome, online: <www.vsj.ca/fr/
sexto.aspx>. The Châteauguay police’s “awareness campaign” titled “Sexts Are Porn” targets
students aged twelve to seventeen and involves police visits to six schools to warn about
the dangers of consensual sexting. “Châteauguay Police Launch ‘Sexts Are Porn’ Campaign
to Rein in Teen Sexting” (25 January 2018), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/teen-sexting-ch%C3%A2teauguay-police-1.4502186>. (“The police have
noted that, on average, since 2014, half of the child pornography files handled by the SPVG
were associated with this phenomenon.” (English translation of French website, online:
<http://www.gatineau.ca/portail/default.aspx?p=guichet_municipal%2fpolice%2fzone_
jeunesse%2fprogrammes_ecoles_secondaires%2fgarde_ca_pour_toi >).
30. Protecting Canadian’s from Online Crime Act, SC 2014, c 31; Criminal Code, RSC 1985,
c C-46, s 162.1(1).
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protect the sexual speech of teens. While subsequent judicial interpretations of
the exception have extended the boundaries of private use, these analyses have
also potentially and paradoxically circumscribed the protection by requiring
youth to retain the ability to “maintain control” of their own images. A key goal
of this article is thus to interrogate the relationship between privacy and control
as it relates to youths’ digital sexual expression.
In order to clarify the exception’s scope and its applicability to teenage
sexting this article begins with a mapping of judicial interpretations of the private
use exception from its inception in 2001 up to and beyond the Supreme Court
of Canada’s most recent consideration of the defence in R v Barabash.31 From
here, fundamental shifts in the technological and sexual terrain are charted in
order to establish a chronology of technological developments and their effects
since Sharpe. These technological and sexual shifts are then discussed in relation
to changes in the legislative terrain, namely the development of new criminal
law provisions that explicitly acknowledge young people’s ability to consent to
sending intimate images of themselves to a peer, including to peers who did not
“participate” in the image’s creation. This most recent legislative development
reclassifies the non-consensual distribution of images that meet the definition
of child pornography as a privacy violation, thus constructing youths’ digital
sexual expression as ontologically other than child pornography.32 Next, privacy’s
meaning, its parameters, and the safeguards required to protect and regulate
it in our digital context are considered. Here the implication of “networked
privates” and “context collapse” for the meaning of “private use” are discussed.
It is argued that the near impossibility of maintaining control and the paradoxical
implications of believing in “control” as a means of preventing harm, requires
further consideration. A more nuanced “privacy calculus” is advanced.
Finally, the article considers the ways in which the sharing of images,
including non-consensual sharing, can be understood as a modern-day iteration
of the sexual rumour mill. Reframing the sharing of sexts as sexual rumours,
it is argued, has implications for how we understand the meaning and boundaries
of privacy, control, and harm at the heart of the private use exception. The article
concludes by suggesting that a consideration of the value of sexual expression
and pleasure for youth is central to any calculation of the costs of classifying
youths’ sexual expression as harmful to children and thus as outside of Charter
protections. It is argued that any clarification of the parameters of private use
must incorporate an analysis of the benefits of sexual expression for young people
31. R v Barabash, 2012 ABQB 99 [Barabash ABQB].
32. Department of Justice, Cyberbullying and the Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, June 2013) at 18.
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and a positive sexual rights framework that recognizes the autonomy of youth
who are of legal age to consent to sexual relations. Moreover, this article argues
that risk of harm posed to children by adolescent sexting does not outweigh
the countervailing right of youths’ freedom of expression, and that adolescent
sexting has a legitimate purpose despite being unrelated to the administration of
justice or to science, medicine, education or art. Finally, this article advances the
position that even in the case of non-consensual distribution of consensual sexts,
child pornography charges are at best ill conceived and at worst unconstitutional.

I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRIVATE USE
EXCEPTION: FROM SHARPE TO BARABASH
Parliament’s main purpose for banning the production, distribution, and
possession of child pornography is the prevention of harm to children and the
need to send a message to Canadians “that children need to be protected from
the harmful effects of child sexual abuse and exploitation and are not appropriate
sexual partners.”33 The Court in Sharpe notes that Parliament set its targets on
clear forms of “child pornography”: “depictions of explicit sex with children,
depictions of sexual organs and anal areas of children and material advocating
sexual crimes with children.” It did not, however, “cast its net over all material
that might conceivably pose any risk to children or produce any negative attitudinal
changes” but, rather, only over material that poses a reasoned risk of harm to
children and, even then, only where the countervailing right of free expression or
the public good does not outweigh that risk of harm.34
As noted above, in an effort to remedy a law that the Supreme Court of
Canada deemed “substantially constitutional and peripherally problematic,” the
Court chose to “read into the law an exclusion of the problematic applications of
s. 163.1.”35 Chief Justice McLaughlin read two provisions as being an exception
to the possession of child pornography. She writes:36
… In this case, s. 163.1 might be read as incorporating an exception for the
possession of:
1. Self-created expressive material: i.e., any written material or visual representation
created by the accused alone, and held by the accused alone, exclusively for his or
her own personal use; and
33. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 34, citing House of Commons Debates, 34-3, No 16 (3 June
1993) at 20328.
34. Ibid at para 34 [emphasis added].
35. Ibid at para 114.
36. Ibid at para 115.
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2. Private recordings of lawful sexual activity: i.e., any visual recording, created by or
depicting the accused, provided it does not depict unlawful sexual activity and is
held by the accused exclusively for private use.

The first category, the Court notes, would capture materials such as a teenager’s
confidential diary or any other written work or visual representation created by,
and possessed by, a single person for their sole use.37 The second category “would
protect auto-depictions, such as photographs taken by a child or adolescent of
him-or herself alone, kept in strict privacy and intended for personal use only.”38
According to the Court, the activity recorded must be legal in that it must be
consensual and must preclude the exploitation or abuse of children. In addition,
all of the parties must also have consented to the creation of the record, and the
person possessing the recording must have personally recorded or participated in
the sexual activity in question.39
Following the 2001 Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Sharpe, the four
counts of child pornography possession filed against Sharpe were remitted for
trial with the newly formed private use exception defence in place. The Crown
submitted that Sharpe’s impugned stories contravened section 163.1(1)(b) of
Criminal Code, which makes illegal any written material or visual representation
that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen.
In 2002, Justice Duncan Shaw of the Supreme Court of British Columbia
acquitted Sharpe of all charges pertaining to the written materials.40 He held that
within criminal law the threshold is elevated to material that actively induces
an offence against children, which he did not find to be true of the stories in
Sharpe’s possession. With respect to the impugned images, Sharpe argued that
they depicted legal sexual activity between youth (at that time, the age of consent
was fourteen)41 and, thus, met the prongs of the newly established defence under
the private use exception. Justice Shaw, however, found no evidence that the
photos were in fact kept in strict privacy. Referring to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s previous decision and its reiteration that “the protection afforded by this
exception would extend no further than to materials intended solely for private
use. If materials were shown to be held with any intention other than for personal
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at para 116. In both instances, the use of “such as” indicates that the example is
not exhaustive.
39. Ibid.
40. Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1.
41. The age of consent in Canada was raised to sixteen in 2008. Much of the case law cited
herein refers to fact scenarios involving fourteen- and fifteen-year olds who were legally able
to provide consent at the time that the incidents occurred.
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use, their possession would then fall outside the exception’s aegis and be subject
to the full force of s. 163.1(4),”42 Justice Shaw found that “the photographs must
be intended for the private use of the parties depicted within.”43 Thus, he found
Sharpe guilty on all counts relating to the photographs.
The issue of private and personal use was central to the next interpretation of
the exception, six years after it was originally drafted. In 2007, the Ontario Court
of Appeal delivered its decision in R v Dabrowski, wherein a twenty-eight-yearold male, who pretended to be nineteen, engaged in an intimate, five-month-long
relationship with a fourteen-year-old female.44 During the relationship, the couple
filmed themselves engaging in sex acts alone and in front of the accused’s friends.
When the relationship ended, Dobieslaw Dabrowski gave the physical videotape
recordings to a friend for safekeeping. He was charged with uttering a threat
by telephone, criminal harassment, and creating, possessing, and distributing
pornography but was acquitted on all counts at trial. At trial, Justice Lynn Leitch
of the Superior Court of Ontario reasoned that creation for private use did not
mean that the tapes have to remain in the creator’s possession. Drawing on the
definition of possession as set out in section 4(3) of the Criminal Code, Justice
Leitch noted that “a person is in possession of an item when he knowingly has it
in the actual custody or possession of another. The item is therefore in the actual
possession of one person and attributed to the other.”45 Given the evidence that
the “[tapes] were given to someone for safe keeping who did not watch them,
who was asked not to watch them or show them to anyone,” Justice Leitch writes:
“I am not satisfied that the video tapes were created or possessed with anything
other than the intention for [private] personal use.”46
On appeal, the Crown argued that Justice Leitch erred when she applied
the private use defence to a fact scenario wherein the materials were given to
a third party who was neither a creator nor a participant. This interpretation
of possession, the Crown argued, was overly liberal. In addition, they alleged
that threats to distribute the materials were not adequately scrutinized by the
trial judge and that these threats classified the materials as being beyond simple
“personal use” and, therefore, outside of the protection of the Sharpe defence.
Accepting this argument in part, Justice of Appeal James MacPherson referenced
Sharpe and noted that, “[i]f materials were shown to be held with any intention
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 118.
Sharpe BCSC, supra note 1 at para 19.
R v Dabrowski, 2007 ONCA 619.
Ibid at para 9.
Ibid.
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other than for personal use, their possession would then fall outside the exception’s
aegis and be subject to the full force of s.163.1(4).”47 The issue of whether the
accused created or used the videos in order to extort or threaten the girl was
determined to be central to the determination of guilt and to the applicability of
the Sharpe defence, and a retrial was ordered. However, with the case concluded,
Justice MacPherson rejected the Crown’s “bright line” assertion that possession
be exclusive and physical in order to qualify for the defence, stating instead:
Although the “private use” exception should be applied with genuine caution, it
goes too far to equate it in an absolute fashion with exclusive possession. Such an
equation would render unlawful such activities as placing these videotapes in a safety
deposit box or turning them over to a lawyer or other trusted person for safekeeping.
In my view, there is an evidentiary connection between holding relevant material in
‘strict privacy’ and maintaining exclusive possession. It is a factual question whether
giving up exclusive possession results in a loss of strict privacy. Each case must be
assessed on its own facts. 48

To determine the circumstances in which another party may be in possession
of the materials, Justice MacPherson enumerated a list of relevant questions:
Questions such as to whom was the material given, what was the purpose or reason
for the transfer, what terms or conditions were agreed upon when the material was
given up, what control did the accused maintain over the material, was the material
in fact viewed by anyone other than the consensual participants, would be relevant,
all in the context of the credibility of the accused and others. 49

Justice Macpherson drew on a body of case law that interpreted private
possession as “joint possession” requiring knowledge, consent, and some degree
of control. Not only does this shift away from requiring strict physical possession
and towards effective control, expanding the scope of what can be considered
private materials, but it also, in effect, extends the scope of the exception to
transmission or distribution of “child porn.” This right is extended further in
subsequent case law with implications for teenage sexting’s constitutionality.
The first case to examine the private use exception as it pertains to the
Internet was the Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in R v Bono.50
In this case, a fifty-two-year-old male who pretended to be a sixteen-year-old
boy named “Marco” pursued an online relationship with the victim from when

47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibid at para 24, quoting Sharpe, supra note 5.
Ibid at paras 29-30.
Ibid at para 30.
R v Bono, 2008 CanLII 51780 (ON SC) [Bono].
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she was fourteen until she was seventeen years of age.51 In 2002, when the victim
was sixteen years of age, she videotaped herself masturbating and sent them to
“Marco.”52 At the age of seventeen, she made three additional videos and sent
them to another of Bono’s aliases, a thirty-eight-year-old man named “Anthony,”
who would intervene to repair the deteriorating relationship between “Marco”
and the girl. Over that time, thousands of online text-based communications and
countless phone discussions transpired between the victim and the aliases created
by the applicant.53 Having pled guilty to charges of possessing child pornography
and child luring, Bono brought an application to strike his guilty pleas, arguing
that he was not informed of the defence of private use. Justice Guy DiTomaso
concluded that the private use exception did not apply based on the fact that
“the applicant had not recorded the images nor had he participated in the sexual
activity in question.”54 In addition, given that consent to engage in otherwise
lawful sexual activity was vitiated by fraud, Justice DiTomaso concluded that the
images depicted unlawful sexual activity and therefore failed another key prong
of the private use test. Furthermore, the court reasoned that Bono’s conduct
posed “a reasoned risk of harm to children” that would negate the applicability of
the exemption.55 As such, the viability of the “private use” exemption as a defence
failed, and the application to strike his earlier guilty pleas was dismissed.56
It was not until the 2011 decision in R v Keough that the private use
exception’s scope and application as a defence in a criminal matter was thoroughly
considered, particularly as it relates to third-party possession.57 In this case, Jason
Keough was charged with making and possessing child pornography, among
other offences, after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police searched his home and
seized a number of video recordings depicting the sexual activities between two
young couples whom he had befriended over the course of his employment as
a community youth worker and school guidance counsellor and as a roommate.
In the first scenario of this case, fifteen-year-old S.C. and her eighteen-year-old
boyfriend M.A. consensually produced a video recording their sexual relations
solely for their own private use. Keough provided the video recording equipment
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Presumably using chat rooms, although details are not provided.
Presumably via a postal delivery service, although details are not provided.
Bono, supra note 50 at para 25.
Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 26.
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Keough, supra note 20 at para 295. Here, Justice Manderscheid concluded that the exception
operates as a defence in law, such as self-defence or provocation. Criminal Code, RSC 1985,
c C-46, ss 34-35, 37, 232.
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to M.A. for making that recording. Initially, the recording of M.A. and S.C. was
on a mini-cassette, but, upon M.A.’s request, Keough copied the mini-cassette
recording to a VHS-format recording. The VHS-format recording was then given
to M.A. However, M.A. and S.C. subsequently agreed that the VHS recording
should be destroyed.58 M.A. reported that he had done so, but he testified that
he gave Keough the VHS recording and requested that he destroy it.59 Keough,
however, despite knowing S.C.’s age, proceeded to keep the original and produced
two additional copies.60
It was determined by the trial judge that S.C. and M.A.’s recording qualified
for the private use exception as they had recorded lawful sexual activities and the
recording was created together.61 At appeal, the question considered by Justice
Donald Manderscheid was whether “the format change and copying by a third
party have the effect of removing the private use exemption.”62 From the evidence
provided, Justice Manderscheid concluded that it did not.63 Functionally, the
materials remained for private use even though the recordings of S.C. and M.A.
were in the possession of a third party—namely, Keough—because they were
not accessible by anyone other than the creators. Hence, the video’s “privacy”
remained intact.64 The court concluded that M.A and S.C. must have consented
to any collateral viewing of the recorded sexual episode that may have occurred
during the format change.65 However, the court ultimately found that S.C.
did not consent to Keough having ongoing possession of the recordings of her
and M.A. and that this lack of consent removed this recorded material from
the private use exception.66 As such, Keough was found guilty of possession of
child pornography.67
In the second scenario of the case, a couple that lived with Keough—
twenty-year-old C.V. and sixteen-year-old J.W.—video recorded themselves
engaging in various sexual activities. At some point, Keough was provided with
copies, but how or why he had come into their possession was not resolved
by the court. Again, the question faced by Justice Manderscheid was whether
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Keough’s possession could be caught within the scope of the private use
exception. Since there was no evidence to suggest that J.W. had ever consented
to the accused’s possession of the recordings, let alone on an ongoing basis, the
defence was negated and Keough was found guilty. This finding thus reiterated
that third-party possession can qualify as being functionally private and within
the exception’s parameters as long as the image’s original creators have consented
to it and effectively maintained control of the images.
To arrive at these findings, Justice Mandersheid first summarizes the
characteristics of private use material set out in Sharpe:
(1) all participants must consent;
(2) no exploitation or abuse may be involved;
(3) the sexual activity must be lawful;
(4) the person in possession must have either:
(a) been a participant in the recorded sexual activity or
(b) recorded the sexual activity. 68

Having done so, he points to Sharpe at paragraph 116 in order to map the
scenarios to which the exception applies:
(i) A records A for A,
(ii) B records A for A or B,
(iii) A or B records A and B for A or B, or
(iv) C records A and B for A, B, or C.
What the exception does not explicitly identify is the following:
(i) A records A for B, or
(ii) A or B records A and B for C. 69

This mapping is instructive for a few reasons. First, it makes explicit Justice
Manderscheid’s earlier finding that “the private use exception would not seem
to include a sexually explicit recording created by a young person on their own,
and then provided to a second person who is an intimate, but who was not
present when the recording was made” (the A records A for B scenario referenced

68. Ibid at para 188.
69. Ibid at para 69 citing Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 116.
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above).70 The mapping also demonstrates that the constitutionality of sexual
recordings of youths is not subject to a normative taste test given that consensual
voyeuristic threesomes and the recording thereof (C records A and B for A, B,
or C) are protected. As Justice Manderscheid notes, the exception as set out in
Sharpe applies where one person records the sexual activities of a second person.
He thus states: “I cannot see any principled reason where that would not also
apply where two persons engaged in sexual activities and were recorded by a
third.”71 He then goes on to note that
it is not illegal for a person between ages 14 and 18 to engage in sexual activities in
front of an observer. … The observation of those sexual activities is not, in itself,
illegal, provided the young person consents to that viewing and there is no exploitive
component (Criminal Code, s. 153) or conduct that attracts the other Criminal Code
offenses which address morality or sexual activities (for example, Criminal Code, ss.
151, 152, 163, 167, 173).72

By recognizing and making explicit the constitutionality of the “C records
A and B for A, B, or C” scenario, Justice Manderscheid reveals an important and
false division between participating and recording. That is, by acknowledging
the voyeuristic scenario, Justice Manderscheid recognizes the sexual nature of
viewing—the fact that the recorder in the third-party scenario is implicitly
recognized as also being a participant in the sexual activity and an owner of the
expression that is produced in this context. Given this reasoning, the exclusion
of a common sexting scenario from protection—namely, the “A records A for B”
or the “A or B records A and B for C” scenarios—necessitates further analysis.
Justice Manderscheid writes:
It would seem very strange that an adolescent’s healthy sexual relationship and self
actualization would not be reinforced by that adolescent making sexual recordings of
themself, and then sharing those with their partner. … I conclude that to interpret
the R v Sharpe private use exception to exclude that category of material possession
and transfer would deny effective Charter relief by taking an “overly restrictive
interpretation” of the scope of the private use exception identified in R v Sharpe.73

Justice Manderscheid arrives at this conclusion in part by acknowledging
how the shifting technological landscape facilitates such expression. He writes:74

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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[T]he kind of technology available to young persons today provides an
unprecedented ability for young persons to record themselves privately and then
share those recordings. A young woman may take a topless photo of herself on her
cell phone and then send that to her boyfriend. Inside that kind of context I think
the R v Sharpe private use exception could and should apply.

Thus, Justice Manderschied effectively extends the exception’s scope to
include the “distribution” of “child pornography” if the sexual relations depicted
are consensual and the recipient is deemed legally able to possess the material
distributed to them, thus precluding scenarios involving exploitation or abuse.75
Justice Manderscheid conceptualizes his interpretation as clarifying
third-party possession, noting that the newly protected third-party possession
exception would be negated in instances where possession was76
(1) without the consent of all persons recorded;
(2) obtained by fraud or deception;
(3) a result of coercion, threat, or extortion;
(4) results in the loss of control of the private use material;
(5) in exchange for any form of consideration; or
(6) otherwise exploitive or abusive.

Keough thus clarified that “private use” materials can be shared with, or, put
differently, distributed to, parties who were seemingly “not involved” in their
creation, provided certain requirements are met and can be maintained. Again,
“loss of control of the private use material” is explicitly reinforced as a key element
of the standards required to mitigate risks of harm to children. According to
Justice Manderscheid, effective control is lost when: “(1) the private use materials
are transferred or used in a manner not authorized by the third party, or (2)
the ‘owners’ of the private use materials are unable to demand the return of the
materials or their destruction.”77 Despite his explicit acknowledgement of the role
of technology in facilitating new sexual opportunities and modes of expression,
Justice Manderscheid sidesteps the problem of maintaining control when it
comes to new digital technologies. Thus, the relationship between privacy and
maintaining control, and the impact of this requirement for the scope of the
exception, is discussed in greater detail below.

75. Ibid at para 283.
76. Ibid at para 71.
77. Ibid at para 289.
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The next significant interpretation of the exception, and the first to deal
specifically with social media and smartphones, is found in R v Cockell.78 Brian
Cockell, who was twenty-eight years old, met the two female complainants, D.P.
and D.C., on Nexopia, a Canadian social media site, when they were twelve
and thirteen years of age respectively. He later exchanged cellphone numbers
and began texting, meeting up with, and engaging in, sexual activities with
both complainants separately. A number of sexual images and videos of D.C.
were found on the accused’s various laptops and Blackberry cellphone, all of
which were taken with her consent. At issue in Cockell’s appeal of two charges
of possession and one charge of making child pornography was whether or not
the trial judge properly assessed whether D.C. was fourteen years of age (the
age of consent at that time) before engaging in sexual contact with the accused,
thus rendering the sex consensual and making the private use defence potentially
available to the appellant.79
The appeal court agreed with the defence submission that, due to unreliable
testimony from D.C., inconclusive evidence from forensic meta-data experts,
and no supporting submission from the trial judge, there was no reliable evidence
to support allegations that the accused had engaged in sexual contact with
D.C. before she was fourteen years old.80 The appeal court also acknowledged
D.C.’s testimony that she had consented to the recording of the sexual activity.81
However, Justice Myra Bielby of the Alberta Court of Appeal, in interpreting
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Sharpe, extended the exception’s
requirements by adding two additional prerequisites to the availability of the
defence. The first was that there must be a demonstrated “mutuality of benefit”
for all of the parties involved with the materials and the second was that there
must be a standalone analysis of a young person’s consent to ensure that their
participation in creating the materials was given outside of potentially abusive or
exploitative circumstances.82 The court then concluded that there was little or no
mutuality of benefit for D.C. resulting from the creation of the materials, based
in part on the fact that the materials were stored solely on computers owned by
the accused as well as on D.C.’s testimony that she had taken the photographs
“not for her own pleasure, but rather to send to the appellant when he was out of
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town to cheer him up; she testified that she wanted to please him.”83 Justice Bielby
then went on to cite the age difference between the two parties, the manner in
which the relationship evolved, and the disapproval that D.C.’s parents showed
for the relationship as evidence that the relationship was exploitative of the young
female.84 Combined, these findings prompted the court to rule that,85
there is simply no evidence to establish the mutuality and the evidence which was
led points to the existence of exploitation rather than contraindicates it. There is
thus no “air of reality” to the appellant’s claim to the private use defence. Therefore,
although the trial judge did not give reasons for the rejection of this defence, in the
circumstances, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred so that the
appeal on this ground must be dismissed.

Cockell’s leave to appeal this verdict to the Supreme Court of Canada was
denied, and no reasons were provided.
However, as Cockell was being decided, another challenge to the private use
exception—R v Barabash—was working its way through the legal system and was
ultimately heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015. In 2012, Donald
Barabash, who was sixty years old, was charged with one count of possessing child
pornography. Both he and the co-accused, Shane Rollison, who was forty-one
years old, were also charged with making child pornography. The recordings at
issue depicted the accused, primarily Rollison, engaging in a variety of sexual acts
with the complainants, D. and K., two fourteen-year-old female runaways who
had taken up residence in Barabash’s home. These recordings were discovered as
the result of a police investigation of a sexually explicit image of D. and K. which,
according to K.’s testimony, was created by D., using Barabash’s computer and
web camera, and then posted online to Nexopia by D. without K.’s consent. D,
however, was never charged with child pornography offences for these actions.
It was determined by the lower court that the females were of legal age (at the
time of the incident); that they were willing and consenting participants in the
sexual acts and their recordings; and, that the accused did make and possess child
pornography. The central question then concerned the applicability of the private
use defence to the circumstances of the accused.86At trial, Justice Denny Thomas
ruled that the private use exemption outlined in Sharpe had three requirements:
(1) the sexual activity recorded must be lawful; (2) the recording must be made
with consent from all parties depicted within; and, (3) the recording must be held
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for private use only by those involved in its creation.87 In doing so, he rejected
the Crown’s interpretation of the exception as requiring that two separate and
additional requirements be met—namely, that the images must also (1) have
“self-actualizing” or “self-fulfilling” properties and, additionally, (2) be determined
to not result from situations that could be viewed objectively as exploitative or
abusive of children.88 Justice Thomas rejected this argument and concluded that
“[t]his inquiry goes beyond whether the recorded activities are legal, consensual,
and private, and instead requires investigation of the quality and meaning of those
recorded activities.”89 Such a requirement, he argued, would constitute a morally
driven “taste test,” which he deemed contrary to the court’s intent when creating
the defence, adding:90
I observe that in R v Sharpe at para. 107 public perception is specifically excluded as
a reason to criminalize recordings of teenagers engaged in sexual activities: ... “The
fact that many might not favour such forms of expression does not lessen the need
to insist on strict justification for their prohibition. As stated in Irwin Toy, supra, at
p. 976, ‘the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing
ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment.’”

Justice Thomas also commented on the court’s limited ability to fairly and
objectively evaluate what is self-actualizing or expressive sexuality as an outside
observer, and he highlighted a number of negative outcomes for youth should
the Crown’s line of argument be accepted, such as enhanced criminal liability of
young persons, reduced prosecutorial discretion, a lack of clear rules or guidelines
for youth as to what is legal sexual activity, and the disproportionate or differential
criminalization of marginal and minority youth.91 Dismissing these additional
requirements as invalid, as well as the Crown’s arguments that a “synergy of
negative factors”—such as drug use by the females, the young age of the females,
the large age difference between the parties, and the nature of the sexual acts in
the recordings—classify the recordings as being beyond the protection of the
defence, Justice Thomas found the accused to have met the three requirements
set out in Sharpe and acquitted both defendants.92
At appeal, the Crown relied on the ruling in Cockell to argue that the trial
judge in Barabash erred in his interpretation of the private use defence. The
majority of the court agreed and held that the private use exemption required
87.
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a determination of “mutuality of benefit” for all of the parties involved in the
creation of the materials. The appeal court also ruled in favour of creating an
additional standalone requirement that the recorded material must “not involve
child exploitation or abuse as cognizable in law generally, not just crimes under
the Code.”93 The majority found that the trial judge had erred by not properly
considering the exploitative circumstances surrounding the recordings and their
creation and instituted guilty verdicts in place of the acquittals on all counts.94
The accused appealed and tasked the Supreme Court of Canada with clarifying
the private use exemption’s requirements. Justice Andromache Karakatsanis,
on behalf of a unanimous Court, disagreed with the appeal court’s interpretation
of Sharpe and held that exploitation is a component of the lawfulness requirement
and that no additional analysis of factual exploitation is required to qualify for
the defence.95 Section 153.1 of the Criminal Code deems unlawful any sexual
communications or activities with young persons that arise out of relationships of
trust, authority, dependency, or exploitation. If unlawfulness due to exploitation
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the private use exemption cannot be raised,
regardless of whether or not the young person has consented to the activities
and their recording. Justice Karakatsanis also highlighted that section 153.1(2)
provides a list of some of the indicators a trial judge can consider when examining
the presence of exploitation, such as (1) the age of the young person; (2) the
age difference between the parties; (3) the evolution of the relationship; and
(4) the degree of control or influence the person has over the young person.96
In addition, Justice Karakatsanis disagreed with the Crown’s argument that
the private use exemption requires evidence of a “mutuality of benefit” to all
those involved in the creation of the materials. This, she argued, would add an
unnecessary complication to the private use exemption; thus, she found that the
determination of the material’s potential benefits was up to the lawful owners
and creators.97 Having upheld the exception as set out in Sharpe, however, Justice
Karakatsanis noted that the Court in Sharpe had not included any reference to
the creator or participant’s right to maintain ongoing control or to the right to
the return or destruction of the recording raised. She acknowledged that, while
this issue was not relevant on the facts of the appeals before her:98
[i]t may well be that the right of a young person who participates in the recording
to demand the return or destruction of the recording is also implicit in Sharpe’s
weighing of the harm of child pornography against the values of self-expression and
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self-actualization (paras. 102–10). In my view, the balance struck between the right
of free expression and preventing harm to children in Sharpe suggests that young
persons who participate in a sexual recording caught by the private use exception
retain the ability to ensure its return or destruction. This understanding of the
exception would provide protection for young persons who may suffer anxiety or
distress from the knowledge that another person possesses such material and could
unlawfully share it. It would serve to address circumstances in which the risk of harm
outweighs the expressive value of the recording, contrary to the principles articulated in
Sharpe. However, since the question of a right to access or destruction is not relevant
on the facts of these appeals, I would not make any final pronouncement about it.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that, while the
Crown erred in law when attempting to institute additional requirements to the
private use defence, its concerns about the possible exploitative nature of the
relationship were warranted based on the age differences and the fact that the
young females had a history of addiction and homelessness.99 In reviewing the
facts of the case and the trial decision, the Court ruled that “the trial judge’s factual
findings do not adequately establish whether the appellants were in positions
of trust or authority towards the complainants, whether the complainants were
dependent upon them, or whether the relationships were exploitative of K. and
D., as required by s. 153,” and, as such, a new trial should be held to assess the facts
of the case in light of the clarifications made to the role of exploitation in regards
to the private use exemption.100 This case has not yet come to pass. Dabrowski has
since died, and Rollinson is awaiting further action by the Crown.101

II. FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
SEXUAL TERRAIN
Digital communication technologies existed when Sharpe was decided in 2001.
However the evolution of digital and wireless technologies has fundamentally
shifted the social and sexual terrain since then.102 These fundamental shifts
necessitate a reconsideration and clarification of the private use exception’s
borders, the relevance and possibility of “maintaining control” of one’s images,
and of the balance between a right to expression and countervailing interests
and harms. The majority in Sharpe did not reference the Internet in the body of
their decision. The dissent, however, argued that “the widespread availability of
computers and the Internet has resulted in new ways of creating images, and has
99.
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facilitated the storage, reproduction, and distribution of child pornography.”103
While the dissent’s claim about the widespread nature and availability of the
Internet is valid, the Court was likely referring to evidence provided in the
1999 British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Sharpe, which referenced
the scanning of images from print magazines or celluloid, saving these scans
onto CD-ROMSs, JAZ drives, and disks, and distributing them via email
and chat rooms.104
While Canadians were world leaders in terms of Internet use in 2001, half
of the adults in the United States (eighteen years of age and over)—more than
ninety-four million people—did not have Internet access.105 Moreover, while
about seventeen million US teens between the ages of twelve and seventeen
were using the Internet in 2000 (73 percent), and thirteen million were using
instant messaging, the PEW Research Center found that in 2001 the telephone
remained the principle communication amongst teens.106 Ultimately, while
the Internet and digital communication were emerging as a popular means of
communication and expression for youth, the sea change in technology that
has since swept over us had not yet materialized. Despite the fact that Mark
Prensky coined the controversial term “digital native” in 2001 to refer to children
who had grown up using digital technology, Prensky was referring primarily
to youths’ use of video games and computers with precursors to the World
Wide Web such as Bulletin Board Services and UseNet.107 These technologies
predate the development of Web 2.0, user-generated content, camera-equipped
smartphones, wireless networking, and social media. Indeed, the Web 2.0 gained
103. Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 166.
104. R v Sharpe, 1999 BCCA 416 at para 33. According to Detective Waters’s evidence to the
British Columbia Court of Appeal,
[t]he largest volume of material is being distributed through the use of the Internet, through
computers—computer distribution. This can involve material that has been scanned from
publications or pictures of children engaged in sexual activity. We’ve seen the older child
pornography publications that were produced in Europe and Asia that are now showing up
on computer and being distributed on the computers through the Internet. The pictures are
scanned, which means that they are changed into an electronic format and placed on disk—
computer disk. … It’s been an electronic format on disk and then can be distributed through
the computer, either through—which I stated earlier, through email or chat rooms or ICQ.

105. Media Awareness Network and the Government of Canada, “Young Canadians in a Wired
World: The Students’ View” (2001), online: <http://mediasmarts.ca/sites/mediasmarts/files/
pdfs/publication-report/full/YCWWI-student-view.pdf>.
106. Amanda Lenhart, Oliver Lewis & Lee Rainie, Teenage Life Online (Washington, DC:
Pew Research Centre, 21 June 2001), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2001/06/21/
teenage-life-online/>.
107. Mark Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1” (2001) 9:5 On the Horizon 1.
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prevalence after 2002, one year after the “dot-com” bust and the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Sharpe.108
Wireless network capabilities did not develop in Canada and the United
States until the mid-2000s. The first camera-equipped smartphones were released
in 2000 and were far from affordable or ubiquitous.109 It was not until 2007
that the first iPhone was released. Finally, the earliest social networking sites
and video-sharing sites all came after 2001 and included Friendster (2002),
Makeoutclub (2003), MySpace (2003), Nexopia (2003), Facebook (2006),
and YouTube (2005).110 Many of these online platforms have since fallen out
of popularity with youth and been replaced with newer applications such
as Twitter (2006), Tumblr (2007), Instagram (2010), and Snapchat (2011).
As these technologies have become more affordable and accessible, we have
witnessed an amazing uptake in their usage and in how they have altered our
modes of communication and expression. The PEW Research Center’s 2018
survey, “Teens, Social Media and Technology,” found that smartphone ownership
is now nearly universal among teens of different genders, race and ethnicities,
and socio-economic backgrounds. These mobile connections “are in turn fueling
more-persistent online activities: 45% of teens now say they are online on a
near-constant basis.”111
Such activity has increased from the PEW Research Center’s 2015 report
examining teenagers’ use of social media and mobile phones to create, maintain,
and end their friendships and romantic relationships, which determined that
“[f ]ully 88% of American teens ages 13 to 17 have or have access to a mobile
phone of some kind, and a majority of teens (73%) have smartphones.”112 Fully,
108. Web 2.0 describes World Wide Web sites that emphasize user-generated content, usability,
and interoperability. See Graham Cormode & Balachander Krishnamurthy, “Key Differences
Between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0” (2008) 13:6 First Monday np., online: First Monday <http://
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2125/1972>.
109. “Smartphone,” (2012) online: Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartphone>.
110. Facebook began as an internal application limited to Harvard University students. It was
adopted by all US universities and became Facebook.com in August 2005. The network
was extended to anyone with a registered email address in 2006. Sarah Phillips, “A Brief
History of Facebook,” The Guardian (25 July 2007), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia>.
111. Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media and Technology (Washington, DC:
Pew Research Center, May 2018), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/
teens-social-media-technology-2018/>.
112. Amanda Lenhart, Teen, Social Media and Technology Overview (Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center, April 2015), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/
teens-social-media-technology-2015>.
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87 percent of American teens aged thirteen to seventeen have, or have access
to, a desktop or laptop computer, and 58 percent of teens have, or have access
to, a tablet computer.113 Overall, teens have relatively robust levels of access
to technology devices, with seven out of ten teens having access to three or
four of the five items asked about on the survey: desktop or laptop computer,
smartphone, basic phone, tablet, and game console.114 The Pew Research Center’s
2018 “Teens, Social Media and Technology” survey also concluded that “[t]he
social media landscape in which teens reside looks markedly different than it did
as recently as three years ago.”115
These new modes of communication are now widely used by adults and
teens to make and maintain friendships, “hook up” (by facilitating offline sex),
engage in digital intimacy or cybersex, date (often long distance), and break up
with romantic partners.116 Online spaces now play a major role in how adults
and teens flirt, pursue, and communicate with potential and current crushes.117
In her “Six Facts about Teen Romance in the Digital Age,” Monica Anderson
reveals that, “[a]lthough most teen romantic relationships do not start online,
digital platforms serve as an important tool for flirting and showing romantic
interest. Half of teens (50%) say they have friended someone on Facebook or
another social media site as a way to show romantic interest, while 47% have
expressed attraction by liking, commenting on or interacting with that person
on social media.”118 When asked about a number of ways in which they might
spend time with their current partner or significant other (or most recent past
partner, in the case of teens who are not currently romantically involved but
who have been in a relationship of some kind in the past), 92 percent of teens
in romantic relationships have spent time text messaging with their partner at
least occasionally; 70 percent have spent time together posting on social media
sites; and 69 percent have spent time with their significant other using instant or
online messaging.119 Other common ways in which teens have spent time with
their romantic partners include video chatting (55 percent); using messaging

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Anderson & Jiang, supra note 111 at 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Monica Anderson, Six Facts about Teen Romance in the Digital Age (Washington,
DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), online: <http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2015/10/01/6-facts-about-teen-romance-in-the-digital-age/>.
119. Lenhart, Anderson & Smith, supra note 12 at 32.
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applications (49 percent), email (37 percent), and talking while playing video
games together (31 percent).120
Numerous US and Canadian studies indicate that adults and youth now
regularly use smartphones for creating and sharing sexual and nude imagery.
A recent ongoing six-year longitudinal study of 964 ethnically diverse high
school students in the United States concludes that “sexting is a new ‘normal’
part of adolescent sexual development and not strictly limited to at-risk
adolescents.”121 A 2018 meta-analysis of thirty-nine sexting studies (with
110,380 participants) determined that the observed increases in teenage sexting
since 2009 corresponded to increases in smartphone ownership among teens.122
Although rates of sexting are hard to determine due to the variance in definitions
and sampling techniques,123 the 2018 meta-analysis found that about one in
seven individuals (or 14.8 percent) between the ages of twelve and seventeen had
sent sexts, and approximately one in four individuals (27.4 percent) had received
them.124 These numbers mark a significant increase from the 2009 PEW Research
Center’s findings of 4 percent and 15 percent of twelve to seventeen year olds,
sending and receiving sexts, respectively.125
Canadian studies have reached similar conclusions. In 2014, Media
Smarts released its national Canadian survey of nearly 5,500 students from
Grade 4 to Grade 11 entitled Sexuality and Romantic Relationships in the Digital
Age.126 According to this study, sexting practices tend to increase with age and
accessibility to personal cellphones: eight per cent of students in Grades 7–11
with access to a cellphone have sent a sext of themselves to someone, while nearly
25 percent of those participants had received a sext.127 Fifteen per cent of students
120. Ibid at 32.
121. Jeff R Temple & Hyejeong Choi, “Longitudinal Association between Teen Sexting and
Sexual Behavior” (2014) 134 Pediatrics e1287 at e1287.
122. Sheri Madigan et al., “Prevalence of Multiple Forms of Sexting Behavior among Youth:
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” (2018) 172 JAMA Pediatrics 327.
123. Lenhart & Duggan, supra note 12. According to Bianca Klettke and her co-authors’ recent
systematic review of the literature on sexting’s prevalence rates, “both sending and receiving
sexts is substantially more prevalent amongst adults than adolescents”. Bianca Klettke, David
J Hallford & David J Mellor, “Sexting Prevalence and Correlates: A Systematic Literature
Review” (2014) 34 Clinical Psychol Rev 44 at 48-9.
124. Madigan et al., supra note 122.
125. Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting: How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending Sexually
Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images via Text Messaging (Washington, DC: Pew Research
Center, 2009); See also Yara Barrense-Dias et al., “Sexting and the Definition Issue” (2017)
61 J Adolescent Health 544.
126. Valerie Steeves, Sexuality and Romantic Relationships in the Digital Age, Phase 3: Young
Canadians in a Wired World (Ottawa: MediaSmarts, 2014), online: <http://mediasmarts.ca/
ycww/sexuality-romantic-relationships-digital-age>.
127. Ibid.
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in Grade 11 admitted to having sexted at least once, and just under one-quarter
of the students with access to a cellphone who have sent a sext of themselves
reported that the person who received the sext forwarded it to someone else.128
Of the twenty-four per cent of students in Grades 7–11 with cellphones who
have received a sext from its creator, fifteen per cent forwarded it to someone
else. The findings of this study also indicate that, “although boys and girls are
equally likely to create a sext, older students in general, and boys in particular,
are more likely to receive them and forward them to others,” yet “sexts of boys
are more likely to be forwarded than sexts of girls.”129 Furthermore, the majority
of participants admitted to sexting regardless of the household rules set by their
parents, which suggests that teens may continue to sext regardless of whether
adults deem it socially acceptable.130 The findings of Media Smarts study are
in line with research on teenaged sexting coming out of the United States,
such as Bianca Klettke, David Hallford, and David Mellor’s systematic review
of the literature.131 Additional evidence reveals that, across all age groups, the
proportion of cellphone owners that say that they have sent and received sexual
or nude pictures has increased over time.132 Statistically significant increases
between 2012 and 2014 demonstrate that this expressive practice is growing in
prevalence and importance.133
Klettke and co-authors’ 2014 review of the sexting literature, as well as
Livingstone and Smith’s review of research published evaluating the harms
experienced by child users of online and mobile technologies since 2008, conclude
that mobile and online risks are increasingly intertwined with pre-existing
(offline) risks in children’s lives.134 For instance, Livingstone and Smith found
that the risks of cyberbullying, contact with strangers, sexual messaging and
pornography generally affect fewer than one in five adolescents who frequent
the Internet. “Prevalence estimates”, they suggest, “vary according to definition
and measurement, but do not appear to be rising substantially with increasing
access to mobile and online technologies, possibly because these technologies
pose no additional risk to offline behaviour, or because any risks are offset by a
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Klettke, Hallford & Mellor, supra note 122 at 45.
Lenhart & Duggan, supra note 12.
Ibid at 18.
Klettke, Hallford, Mellor, supra note 122; Sonia Livingstone & Peter K Smith, “Annual
Research Review: Harms experienced by child users of online and mobile technologies: The
nature, prevalence and management of sexual and aggressive risks in the digital age” (2014)
55 J Child Psychol & Psychiatry 635.
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commensurate growth in safety awareness and initiatives.”135 They go on to state,
“To those who find it implausible that new technologies have not increased the
risk of harm in children’s lives, it is worth noting that, over the period when
internet and mobile use have risen sharply, long-term measures of harm to
children reveal little or no increase over recent years, and some reductions in
bullying and victimization.”136

III. FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE TERRAIN:
NEW INTIMATE IMAGES LAWS
Fundamental shifts in the legislative terrain include debates about the applicability
of child pornography offences to youths’ self-created and shared digital sexual
imagery. These developments raise significant questions about the scope of the
private use exception and the constitutionality of our child pornography laws
more broadly. In 2012, federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible
for justice and public safety struck a subcommittee to identify potential gaps
in the Criminal Code related to the non-consensual distribution of “intimate
images” of both adults and youths. The Coordinating Committee of Senior
Officials’ Cybercrime Working Group (CCSO CWG) released their report the
following June.137 In it, they advanced a definition of an intimate image, which,
they acknowledged, would constitute child pornography if the person depicted
was less than eighteen years of age. This definition, they write,138
raises questions as to what options should be available to deal with an adult or young
offender who may have distributed an intimate image of a person who is under the
age of 18. Should the offender be charged with a child pornography offence? Or
should the police and/or Crown have the option of proceeding under the proposed
new offence, which would be a less serious and less stigmatizing offence?

On 20 November 2013, Minister of Justice Peter MacKay introduced
Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Canada Evidence Act, the
Competition Act, and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act,
in the House of Commons.139 The Bill integrates most of the CCSO CWG’s
recommendations and creates a new Criminal Code offence (section 162.1) of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Livingstone & Smith, supra note 134 at 645-46.
Ibid.
CCSO CWG, supra note 32.
Ibid at 18.
Bill C-13, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Canada Evidence Act, the Competition
Act, and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 (first
reading 20 November 2013); SC 2014, c 31.

Karaian, Brady, Revisiting the “Private Use Exception” 329

knowingly publishing, distributing, transmitting, selling, making available,
or advertising an “intimate image” of a person without the consent of the person
depicted within. The definition of “intimate image” for the purposes of the new
provision includes materials that are captured by the child pornography laws.140
Notably, consent to distribution is a defence in the new intimate images law and
thus seems to support the broader interpretation of “private use” set out by Justice
Manderscheid in Keough.141 As such, with the development of this new provision,
the legislature implicitly acknowledges that a teen can consent to transmitting or
distributing intimate images of him or herself to another teen, including a teen
who did not “participate” in the image’s creation. The only restriction imposed
is that an intimate image cannot be non-consensually sent to a third party. Also
of note is that the new hybrid offence is punishable on indictment by up to five
years of imprisonment or, upon summary conviction, to a fine of not more than
$5,000 and/or six months of imprisonment. The penalty for child pornography,
also a hybrid offence, however, includes mandatory minimum sentence of between
ninety days and one year depending on the charge, mandatory registration as a
sex offender, compliance with a DNA bank order, and the stigma of a child
pornography conviction.142
The CCSO CWG acknowledges a reluctance by the members of the
provincial and territorial Public Prosecution Service of Canada to lay any child
140. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 162.1(2). Section 162.1(2) includes the following:
Intimate image means a visual recording of a person made by any means including a
photographic, film or video recording,
(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her
breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity;
(b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that gave rise to
a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at
the time the offence is committed.is defined as a visual recording (as opposed to written
materials or audio recordings, for example) by means of a photographic, film or video
recording. It must be of a person: in the nude; or exposing his or her genital organs or anal
region or breasts; or engaged in explicit sexual activity.

141. Bill C-13 does not add the new offence to s 150.1 of the Criminal Code, which outlines
the sexual offences for which consent is not a defence as well as the rules relating to age of
consent. Julia Nicol & Dominique Valiquet, Legal and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary: Bill C-13: An Act to Amend
the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Publication no. 41-2-C13-E (11 December 2013, revised
28 August 2014).
142. Nicol & Valiquet, ibid at 6–7.

330

(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

pornography charges in non-consensual distribution cases involving consensually
created images depicting persons under eighteen years of age: “In their view,
the harm resulting from the non-consensual distribution of intimate images
(i.e., breach of privacy) is qualitatively different from the harm resulting from
the distribution of child pornography (i.e., sexual exploitation of children).”143
Whereas a major objective of child pornography laws is to protect children from
sexual abuse in the making of child pornography, to protect children who have
been abused from further harm via the consumption of their abuse images, and to
protect children by preventing the fueling of fantasies and facilitation the sexual
solicitation of children, the new “intimate images” law constructs the harms of
this same materials in terms of humiliation, reputational damage, emotional,
physical and economic fallout.144
Other members of the CCSO CWG expressed the view that the child
pornography provisions were not designed to address non-consensual distribution:
“The prevalence of this activity among young adults and youth has been fueled
by the growth in social media and it is becoming increasingly evident that these
types of cases are being dealt with differently by police, Crown and the courts than
143. Ibid. For more on this see Sarah Wastler, “Harm in Sexting: Analyzing the Constitutionality
of Child Pornography Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession,
and Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by Teenagers” (2010) 33 The. Harv.
JL & Gender 687.
144. CCSO CWG, supra note 32. Notably, the harms that may flow from non-consensual
distribution of consensually produced sexts are not entirely distinct from the physical,
emotional, and psychological consequences that may flow from the dissolution of off-line
sexual romances and distribution of sexual rumours. Furthermore, greater acknowledgement
of the complex relationship between sexting and the development of mental health issues and
suicide is necessary. In one interview regarding a high profile sexting and cyberbullying case,
Amada Todd’s mother, Carol, is quoted as saying:
“Amanda’s story, when you look at all the different pieces, it’s very complicated,” Todd said
from her home in Port Coquitlam, B.C., adding that her daughter had a learning disability
that affected her coping skills. “I don’t really like it when they say Amanda was cyberbullied to
death. That wasn’t the case and I don’t think there’s enough supports for kids for mental health
issues, which is ultimately why they take their own lives.

Alison Auld, “Link between Cyberbullying and Teen Suicides Oversimplified: Experts,
Parents.” Global News (15 December 2013), online: <http://globalnews.ca/news/1031407/
link-between-cyberbullying-and-teen-suicides-oversimplified-experts-parents/>. For more
on this complex relation see: Wayne MacKay, “Respectful and Responsible Relationships:
There’s No App for That - The Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on Bullying and
Cyberbullying” (2012), online:<http://www.unlikecyberbullying.ca/sites/default/files/
downloads/cyberbullyingtaskforcereportmarch22.pdf> at 105; Panagiota Korenis & Stephan
Bates Billick, “Forensic Implications: Adolescent Sexting and Cyberbullying” (2014) 85
Psychiatric Q 97 at 101.
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‘typical child pornography cases.’”145 This claim has significant bearing for the
constitutional status of consensually created and shared images and the scope of the
private use exception. Moreover, it has significant implications for contemporary
policing and child protection initiatives. Any anti-sexting campaigns initiated by
police agencies or federally funded child protection agencies should be updated
immediately so that they are not in direct contradiction to the law.
Some federal representatives of the CCSO CWG expressed concerns that the
broad scope of child pornography offences may be questioned if cases involving
older teens are being more often resolved by resorting to the proposed intimate
images offence. Indeed, this broad scope should be questioned in light of the
developments outlined above and in the following sections of this article. Even the
staunchest child protectionists and critics of the freedom of expression argument
advanced in Sharpe have argued that youth who create sexual images of themselves
“are not in actual fact in possession of child pornography notwithstanding
the definition in the Canadian criminal code” and that the oppression of the
minor is clearly missing when non-exploitative conditions prevail.146 The new
intimate image provision thus captures the same self-produced materials as our
child pornography laws yet reclassifies this imagery, redefines its harms, and
subsequently reduces its sentences. The implication of this for expanding the
private use exception’s scope is significant.
Relatedly, it should be noted that the harms of defining child pornography
broadly and imprecisely also concern those working in the field of child protection
and child sexual abuse. Advocating for more specific and clear terminology
when defining sexual representations of children and youth, Jennifer Martin
145. CCSO CWG supra note 32 at 18. The authors cite R v Walsh (2006), 208 OAC 42 at para
60. This case involves a twenty-three-year-old man who distributed sexual photographs of his
fifteen-year-old former girlfriend to at least one friend, leading to further distribution to her
school community and family.
146. Sonja Grover, “Oppression of Children Intellectualized as Free Expression under the
Canadian Charter: A Reanalysis of the Sharpe Possession of Child Pornography Case” (2004)
11:4 Intl J Child Rts 311 at 317. It should be noted, however, that Grover suggests these
youth “need to be assessed by Child Welfare to determine whether there are or are not child
protection concerns, rather than being held criminally liable for expressing their sexuality”
and that their depictions and written materials ought to be considered unlawful because of
the risk they pose to other children who may be victimized if the images are used by others
to groom them. Grover also argues that if it is found that the depictions held by minors
“involve coercion of one child by another, for instance an older child against a younger
child, or even one peer against another, the material would then also become, on the view
expressed here, a category of child pornography this time produced by children themselves.”
at 330, note 1.
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and Ramona Alaggia note how issues of language are not merely semantic.147
Referring to images of child sexual abuse and exploitation as child pornography
rather than as child sexual abuse images online (CSAIO), they argue, has
negative social and legal consequences. Using the term child pornography
when referring to CSAIO “may contribute to detachment and to a degree of
disconnection from the egregious nature of the material,” and they note that
“[s]ome argue that the term child pornography distorts the serious nature of
child victimization when used in reference to sexual abuse images of children
because it implies conventional pornography with a child subject and, as such,
conveys the impression of consensual activity.”148 Imprecise language similarly
has implications for how we respond culturally and legally to adolescents’
digital produced and shared sexual images. Referring to these as images child
pornography gives rise to myriad concerns about the violation of young peoples’
constitutionally protected expressive rights and to their potential criminalization
as child pornographers.

IV. SHIFTING PRIVACY AND COMMUNICATION NORMS:
NETWORKED PRIVACY, THE CONTROL PARADOX, AND
AN UPDATED PRIVACY CALCULUS
Privacy is one of the key elements of the private use exception as well as one of
the key issues of our time. And, yet, “there is little consensus regarding what
privacy is and when it has been violated.”149 This is complicated further by new
technologies that have significantly increased the volume of data that is now
being (self )-produced, widely and rapidly shared, infinitely stored, aggregated,
and subsequently subjected to powerful algorithms for future use by individuals,
corporations, and the state.150 Given the centrality of privacy to the exception,
its meaning, parameters, and the safeguards required to protect and regulate it in
our digital context begs further consideration.

147. Jennifer Martin & Ramona Alaggia, “Sexual Abuse Images in Cyberspace: Expanding the
Ecology of the Child” (2013) 22 J Child Sexual Abuse 398 at 398.
148. Ibid at 407.
149. Laura Austin, “Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification” (2010) 55 McGill
LJ 165 at 168.
150. See danah boyd’s discussion of the ease with which data can be recorded and archived,
copied, shared with large audiences, accessed by others, and found in the future.
danah boyd, It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2014).
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Nearly a decade has passed since Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg was
misquoted as claiming that “privacy is no longer a social norm.”151 Since then,
US and Canadian scholars and courts have clarified that privacy remains a widely
maintained value but that it is experienced differently in a digital context. Leading
technology and social media scholars, danah boyd and Alice Marwick, have
consistently found that “people care deeply about privacy and develop innovative
strategies to achieve privacy while participating in the systems that allow them
to access information, socialize with friends, and interact with contemporary
entertainment platforms.”152 boyd has influentially argued that new information
and communication technologies have blurred the boundary between public and
private, resulting in, what she calls, “networked privates” and “networked publics”
with diverse influences on individuals’ concerns and their decisions regarding
privacy.153 These networks have come about in part because the properties of
digital technology and social media have made creating boundaries around these
online spaces far more difficult.154 As boyd notes, most social networking sites
are structured on the principle of “public by default, private through effort.”155
Consequently, young people who have active social lives online have been found
to “shy away from the conventional binary model which sees information as either
open or secret, safe to share or unsafe,” preferring instead “to manage disclosure
by sharing deliberately selected pieces of information based on audience and
context”156 and to purposefully anonymize their images by excluding identifying
features or contexts. The next section reconsiders the meaning of “private use”
in a digital culture wherein one’s belief in control is paradoxical, contexts collapse,
and images are increasingly taking the place of words.

151. Bobbie Johnson, “Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,” The Guardian
(11 January 2010), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/
facebook-privacy>.
152. Alice E Marwick & danah boyd, “Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context
in Social Media” (2014) 16 New Media & Society 1051; Alice E Marwick, Claire Fontaine
& danah boyd, “Nobody Sees It, Nobody Gets Mad: Social Media, Privacy, and Personal
Responsibility among Low-SES Youth” (2017) 3 Social Media & Soc’y 1.
153. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150; see also Laura Brandimarte, Alessandro Acquisti &
George Loewenstein, “Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox” (2012) 4
Soc Psychol & Personality Sci 340.
154. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150 at 47.
155. Ibid at 61.
156. Sonia Livingstone, “Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers’
Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and Self-Expression” (2008) 10 New
Media & Society 393; Karaian & van Meyl, supra note 23.
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A. CONTROL AND ITS PARADOXES

In the literature on privacy, one’s protection of one’s privacy often depends on
the degree of control they are able to maintain, so much so that “privacy itself is
often defined as the control over personal information flows.”157 As the case law
outlined above reveals, the Supreme Court of Canada and subsequent judicial
interpretations of the private use exception associate the prevention of future
harm to one’s self and to other children with “maintaining privacy” and with
“maintaining control.”158 The issue of control is raised in Keough, where Justice
Manderscheid found that the “third-party possession private use exception
is always negated where possession is: (1) without the consent of all persons
recorded … (4) results in the loss of control of the private use material,”159 adding
that “effective control is lost when … the ‘owners’ of the private use materials are
unable to demand the return of the materials or their destruction.”160 It is also
reiterated in Barabash, despite not being central to the fact scenario under
consideration by the court.161
Given fundamental shifts in technology and the social and sexual context
in which nudes are produced, distributed, and interpreted, emphasizing the
“maintenance of control” as a ground for constitutional protection and a means
of preventing harm to other children has become increasingly untenable. The
affordances of digital technology—the ease, speed, and scope with which sexual
imagery can be created, recorded, copied, archived, shared, and searched,
as is referenced in more recent case law—evidences the near impossibility of
maintaining control.162 Moreover, while privacy and control of one’s images
remain a high priority for young people and adults alike, digital technology
has altered communication and sexual norms in such a way that to opt out of,
or abstain from, digital sexual expression is less and less a viable choice for many
individuals, despite knowledge of its risks.
Evidence of young peoples’ attempts to manage their privacy is demonstrated
by shifts in usage over time. In 2008, Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman, and Nicholas

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein, supra note 153 at 341 [citations omitted].
R v Keough, supra note 20 at para 192.
Ibid at para 71.
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R v Barabash, supra note 31 at para 27.
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Christakis found that 33 percent of teenagers used privacy controls.163 By 2012,
however, 60 percent of teens were using “friends only” filters, and 25 percent
restricted their communication to “friends of friends.”164 This is demonstrated
further by teens’ move away from Facebook to newer platforms such as
Snapchat—a mobile messaging application released in 2012—that provide
private channels for communication between smaller groups of friends.165 Paul
Hodkinson argues that while some teenagers’ content remains fully public,
including users of platforms such as Twitter that do not offer friends-only
controls, “there may be a direction of travel among teens towards friends-only
communication as default where it is available.”166
While the management of privacy online by teens affords a degree of “control
over how information flows, who has access to it, and in what context,” the
possibility of full control has been called into question by technology experts
such as Microsoft researcher danah boyd.167 In her research on youths’ integration
of technology into their everyday practices, boyd argues that, in a networked age,
“[a]ny model of privacy that focuses on the control of information will fail.”168
Achieving absolute control, boyd writes,169
presumes many things that are often untenable. … One slip-up or data leakage
and whatever was once protected can easily enter into a networked public where
it may enter broader databases, be aggregated with other data, and circulate. In a
networked world, data is more persistent, replicable, searchable, and scalable than
ever before. Trying to achieve perfect control will only lead to frustration.

Whether as a result of snooping parents, broken-hearted or malicious
ex-partners, hackers, or the sheer nature of our technological infrastructure,
legal expectations of complete control are unsustainable and should not preclude
163. Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman & Nicholas Christakis, “The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis
of College Student Privacy Settings in an Online Social Network” (2008) 14 J
Computer-Mediated Comm 79.
164. Mary Madden et al, Social Media, Teens and Privacy (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center,
2013), online: <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-socialmedia-and-privacy/>.
165. Emma Velez, “Intimate Publics and Ephemerality, Snapchat: A Case Study,” The Second
Shift (15 September 2014), online: < http://www.secondshiftblog.com/2014/09/
intimate-publics-and-ephemerality-snapchat-a-case-study/>.
166. Paul Hodkinson, “Bedrooms and Beyond: Youth, Identity and Privacy on Social Network
Sites” (2017) 19 New Media & Society 272 at 279.
167. Jacqueline Vickery, “‘I Don’t Have Anything to Hide, But…’: The Challenges and
Negotiations of Social and Mobile Media Privacy for Non-Dominant Youth” (2015) 18
Information Comm & Soc’y 281 at 282.
168. boyd, supra note 150.
169. Ibid.
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consensual teenage sexting from qualifying for constitutional protection as private
use materials. Even the criminal justice system’s attempts to control private data,
including court-protected names of young offenders and victims of crime, have
proven vulnerable to Google search algorithms and hackers.170
Moreover, the greater sense of privacy and control afforded by new privacy
measures and applications has raised questions about the paradoxical impact of
one’s sense of control for online interactions. A growing body of studies from the
social and behavioural sciences reveal that managing and maintaining privacy
in our contemporary context is not only more physically difficult but also
psychologically complex.171 Early research has identified control as a determinant
of risk perception and risk taking; people are more willing to take risks, and judge
those risks as less severe, when they feel in control. For instance, one study found
that participants who were provided with greater explicit control over whether
and how much of their personal information researchers could publish ended
up sharing more sensitive information with a broader audience—the opposite
of the ostensible purpose of providing such control.172 Research thus shows
that a greater sense of control can paradoxically reduce privacy concern, which,
in turn, can have unintended effects.173 According to Brandimarte, Acquisti,
and Loewenstein’s study, people who experience more perceived control over
limited aspects of privacy sometimes respond by revealing more information (less
privacy), to the point where they end up being more vulnerable as a result of the
measures ostensibly meant to protect them.174
On the other hand, lower perceived control can result in lower disclosure,
even if the associated risks of disclosure are lower: “In other words, our results
provide evidence that control over personal information may be a necessary
(in ethical or normative terms) but not sufficient condition for privacy
170. Lisa Vaas “12-Year-Old Canadian Boy Admits to Hacking Police and Government
Sites for Anonymous” (26 October 2013), online: Sophos.com <https://nakedsecurity.
sophos.com/2013/10/26/12-year-old-canadian-boy-admits-to-hacking-police-andgovernment-sites-for-anonymous/>; Andrew Duffy, “Google Is Linking Secret,
Court-Protected Names—including Victim IDs—to Online Coverage,” Ottawa
Citizen (21 September 2017), online: <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/
google-is-linking-secret-court-protected-names-including-victim-ids-to-online-coverage>.
171. Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein, supra note 153. Peter Harris, “Sufficient grounds for
optimism? The relationship between perceived controllability and optimistic bias” (1996) 15
J Soc & Clinical Psychol 9; Neil Weinstein, “Why it won’t happen to me: Perceptions of risk
factors and susceptibility” (1984) 14 Health Psychol 431.
172. Brandimarte, Acquisti & Loewenstein ibid at 341.
173. Ibid at 346 [citations omitted].
174. Ibid at 340.
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protection.”175 Brandimarte, Acquisti, and Loewenstein label this complexity
the “control paradox.” The development of more privacy control may allow
users of person-to-person photo-sharing applications to share more sensitive
information with larger, and possibly riskier, audiences.176 For example, early
adopters (primarily youth) of Snapchat believed the application’s promise to
“disappear” their images or videos (or “snaps”) within seconds of them being
received, thus preventing the communiqué from being saved and redistributed.
Snapchat quickly became a popular means of sharing nudes. However, soon
after its widespread adoption, Snapchat’s promise to erase images and inform
senders if a screenshot had been taken was revealed to be false.177 If we assume
that the future of data is networked and that we can no longer rely on control
of data to achieve privacy, it becomes imperative to look for alternate models for
understanding youths’ right to express their sexuality. As boyd notes,178
[t]he challenges of networked privacy are not new issues, but social media and
networked culture magnifies them in significant ways. The data that underpins
networked sociality and algorithmic life connects people across numerous axes
time and time again. The future is only going to be more networked, more
interwoven, more of a gnarly hairball that’s impossible to untangle without harsh
cleaving. Expecting that people can assert individual control when their lives are so
interconnected is farcical. Moreover, it reinforces the power of those who already
have enough status and privilege to meaningfully assert control over their own
networks.

B. CONTEXT COLLAPSE

If we cannot rely on control to achieve privacy in a networked age, how then
can we think about privacy as it pertains to one’s intimate images and videos?
Drawing on Helen Nissenbaum, boyd argues that we need to understand privacy
in context but that we must also recognize how digital technologies result in
“context collapse.”179 Privacy norms exist in a dialectic relationship with our
technological, social, sexual, and legal terrain. They also differ between nations and
within communities, depending on the specific context, one’s subject position,

175. Ibid at 345.
176. Ibid.
177. Nicole A Poltash, “Snapchat and Sexting: A Snapshot of Baring Your Bare Essentials” (2013)
19 Rich JL & Tech 14.
178. boyd, supra note 150 at 350.
179. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009).
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and the nature of the relationship between people in any given interaction.180 The
assumption that all people understand, experience, and achieve privacy equally,
particularly as it relates to marginalized subjects such as youth, and to collapsing
contexts, begs further acknowledgement in law, more generally, and in child
pornography law, more specifically.181
One of the primary points established across boyd’s work is that, while
“networked publics” share certain features with bedrooms, park, schools and
shopping malls, they differ substantively from physical public spaces with respect
to how difficult it is for young people to control access to themselves and their
content.182 Social networking platforms, including mobile applications, are less
restricted in terms of form and function than material places.183 Facebook or
Snapchat for example, often brings together individuals from different contexts—
college friends, siblings, old school friends, work colleagues and others—and
such a diverse audience may make it difficult for individuals to grasp the context
in which they are operating and/or to present an effective, coherent, and nuanced
impression of themselves.184 For boyd, then, young people’s attempts to establish
themselves socially and make sense of their place in the world are taking place in
an environment in which control over the reach of what they share is an ongoing
battle.185 Social worlds regularly “collide uncontrollably” in online spaces where
sharing publicly becomes established as a default approach, and the achievement
of greater privacy requires extensive vigilance.186 Such a situation, boyd argues,
inverts the norms of socialization in physical spaces, where interactions are
usually restricted to small, visible groups.
The assumption that digital contexts are stable across space and time also
requires re-evaluation. As Goodwin and co-authors note, social networking

180. Ibid.
181. Alice E Marwick & danah boyd, “Understanding Privacy at the Margins: Introduction”
(2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1157 at 1159.
182. Kath Albury “Just because it’s public doesn’t mean it’s any of your business: Adults’
and children’s sexual rights in digitally mediated spaces” (2017) 19 New Media &
Soc’y 713 at 720.
183. Brady Robards, “Mediating Experiences of ‘Growing Up’ on Facebook’s Timeline: Privacy,
Ephemerality and the Reflexive Project of Self ” in Andy Bennett & Brady Robards, eds,
Mediated Youth Cultures: The Internet, Belonging and New Cultural Configurations (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 26.
184. Hodkinson, supra note 166 at 278.
185. boyd, It’s Complicated, supra note 150.
186. Kate Raynes-Goldie, “Aliases, Creeping, and Wall Cleaning: Understanding Privacy in the
Age of Facebook” (2010) 15 First Monday 36.
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sites problematize context, leading users to grapple with how to manage
contextual integrity:187
With developments in digital technology there is a potential loss of control over the
context in which such texts are read, re-read and shared (potentially ad infinitum).
The meanings subsequently made of the behaviour, possibly years after the fact,
can be radically different from those of the user’s peer group, and the potential
consequences not always positive. … The threat posed by such forms of “context
collapse” is particularly heightened for youth pursuing online activities that sit
outside dominant social norms.

Loss of control over context has contemporary and future criminal
implications for teenage sexters and sext recipients. Innocently swiping through
one’s pictures with a friend and accidentally exposing them to a nude you took or
received in the context of an earlier sexual exchange would theoretically subject
you to distribution charges. Similarly, while a sixteen-year-old’s sext may remain
fixed across time, the context in which this image is possessed will change over
time and established norms and meanings can collapse. A teenage girl’s ownership
of her then teenage girlfriend’s sext, ten years after she received it and post the
dissolution of their relationship, may result in her being viewed as possessing
child pornography, even in the absence of her ex-girlfriend’s exploitation or abuse.
Research with youth finds that, while many young people are aware of
risks related to their online activities, they see the compromise of their privacy
as unavoidable, even imperative, in order to connect with peers online and to
acquire social and personal benefits through accessing social network sites.188
Accessing sexual benefits are no different. Thus, for adults and young people
alike, being overly concerned with privacy can result in digital exclusion and
sexual abstinence. For the majority of people, such exclusion is undesired and
untenable, resulting in a shift towards privacy pragmatism rather than a lack
of concern about privacy.189 Research in this area demonstrates that people “are
concerned about their privacy but are willing to trade some of it for something
beneficial.”190 Niki Fritz and Amy Gonzales draw from privacy calculus theory,
which frames online information provision as a trade off for economic or

187. Ian Goodwin et al, “Ending Up Online: Interrogating Mediated Youth Drinking Cultures”
in Andy Bennett & Brady Robards, eds, Mediated Youth Cultures: The Internet, Belonging and
New Cultural Configurations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 59 at 62.
188. Priscilla Regan & Valerie Steeves, “Kids R Us: Online Social Networking and the Potential
for Empowerment” (2010) 8 Surveillance & Soc’y 151.
189. Raynes-Goldie, supra note 185 at 193.
190. Ibid.
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social benefits.191 Again the inclusion of sexual benefits can be implied by the
latter category.
A privacy calculus approach decides whether to disclose information, weighing
both the perceived benefits and the justification for data. Fritz and Gonzales
consider privacy to be relative rather than simply present or absent, important
or unimportant. Such a nuanced approach to privacy attitudes interrogates how
participants come to the choices they make vis-à-vis disclosure or concealment
rather than attempting to measure a nebulous privacy concern.192 Fully grasping
this privacy calculus in the digital age requires an acknowledgement of the fact
that youth have always, and successfully if given the right tools, balanced the
benefits of engaging in sexual activity and speech against its risks. It also requires
a consideration of the ways in which sexual images have, to some extent, come to
replace acts and words. This latter consideration is discussed below.
C. SHIFTING COMMUNICATION NORMS

How and why control is “lost” in the digital context can be explained in part by
how digital technology has altered communication norms. While some of the
earliest legal writing about teenage sexting analogized the practice to modern-day
love letters,193 the acknowledgement of the role that images have come to play in
young people’s romantic lives is equally important. Indeed, according to Rebecca
Venema and Katharina Lobinger, digital images are the same as words for young
people (insert surprised-face emoji here).194 They constitute “visual conversations”
or a form of “visual texting.” Teens, it has been found, routinely refer to the act
of photo sharing via Snapchat as “sending a message” rather than as “sending a
photo” and describe their interactions as “chatting through pictures.”195 Placed in
this framework, loss of control of one’s image can be conceived of as a modern-day
expression of the sexual rumour mill. A particularly extensive and invasive one,
but a rumour mill nonetheless. Whereas earlier generations may have written
or received a love letter or dialled their crush on a landline and engaged in a bit
of awkward but steamy phone sex, teens today are as likely to go online to rate
191. Niki Fritz & Amy Gonzales, “Not the Normal Trans Story: Negotiating Trans Narratives
While Crowdfunding at the Margins” (2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1189.
192. Janaki Srinivasan et al, “The Poverty of Privacy: Understanding Privacy Trade-Offs from
Identity Infrastructure Users in India” (2018) 12 Intl J Comm 1228.
193. Day, supra note 16.
194. Rebecca Venema & Katharina Lobinger, “‘And Somehow It Ends Up on the Internet’: Agency,
Trust and Risks in Photo-Sharing among Friends and Romantic Partners” (2017) 22
First Monday np.
195. Ibid.
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their crush as “hot,”196 to flirt on Chatroulette,197 or to use Snapchat to send a
nude photo.198 Technology, it seems—from paper and pens to cellphones and the
Internet—has always been used by youth to connect, explore, to communicate
desire, to move things to the next level, and even, sadly, to shame one another for
these desires and behaviours.
Recipients of love notes, phone calls, online ratings, and now nudes are
also known to share these technology-facilitated expressions of interest without
permission. The note is passed around, the phone call is recalled or even possibly
recorded, the online rating is screen shot, and the nude is forwarded. Motivations
for doing so are varied and range from getting a laugh, expressing excitement and
pride, or just plain spitefulness.199 Typically, one does not ask the love-letter writer,
the caller, the clicker, and, now, the photographer for consent to share their “words.”
This is the nature of the sexual rumour mill. The rumour mill may be immoral,
or wrongful, but its status as criminal is questionable and far from inherent.
Understood in this way, the sharing or distribution of images as words affects
how we understand privacy and consent with respect to sexual speech. Indeed,
the sexual rumour mill has always been the source of embarrassment, shame,
and other sorts of negative, and sometimes serious social and even legal (mainly
civil law) consequences. The framing of sexual image-based “chats” or “messages”
between young people via the wide-angle lens of child pornography laws can
distort their meaning and obscure their relationship to young people’s pre-digital
sexual speech, as well as to the research that evaluates how communication norms
have changed with the development of digital technology. Arguing this is in no
way meant to excuse malicious redistribution of images but rather to recognize
that how we understand the meaning and boundaries of privacy, control, and
communication at the heart of the private use exception also has implications for
non-consensual image sharing.

196. “Hot or Not” Wikipedia, online: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hot_or_Not>.
197. Chatroulette, online: <http://chatroulette.com/>.
198. Marc Beaulieu, “If You’re Not Sexting, You’re in the Minority, Says Science,”
CBC News (21 August 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/life/wellness/
if-you-re-not-sexting-you-re-in-the-minority-says-science-1.4255499>.
199. Laura Harvey, “Swagger, Ratings and Masculinity: Theorising the Circulation of Social and
Cultural Value in Teenage Boys’ Digital Peer Networks” (2013) 18 Sociological Res Online 1.
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V. POSITIVE RIGHTS, SEX-POSITIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS,
AND THE VALUE OF SEXUAL PLEASURE
With the creation of the private use exception, the Supreme Court of Canada
sought to “weigh the costs of the law to freedom of expression against the benefits
it confers,” specifically, the benefit of protecting other children from harm.200
The Court concluded that the standard necessary to demonstrate harm was not
concrete scientific proof but, rather, a standard of “reasoned apprehension of
harm.”201 They ultimately concluded that the risk of this harm posed by the
exempted materials was “small, incidental and more tenuous than that associated
with the vast majority of material [involving sexual abuse and exploitation]
targeted by s. 163.1(4).”202
In light of digital technology’s effect on privacy, sexual, and communication
norms, the creation and distribution of youths’ sexual expression is now more
probable, prominent, and accessible than was likely imagined by the Court in
2001. This warrants a re-evaluation of the cost-benefit analysis at the heart of our
child pornography law and the private use exception, particularly a re-evaluation
of the benefits of this expression for youth. While it has been argued by US legal
scholars that the consensual distribution of youths’ sexts ought to be equated
with harm to other children and thus criminalized as child pornography, even
if this means convicting a large number of youths, this is a rare perspective in
the literature, if not in US case law. 203 Few works to date have considered the
relevance of sexual pleasure for obscenity determinations, and even fewer have
done so in relation to young peoples’ digital sexual expression.204
To appreciate the affordances of sexual pleasure and digital sexual expression
for youth, and to adequately weigh the benefits of digital sexual expression
200.
201.
202.
203.

Sharpe, supra note 5 at para 101.
Ibid at para 85.
Ibid at para 100.
Mary Graw Leary, “Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal Response to
Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation.” (2008) 15 Va J Soc Pol’y & L 1.
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their risks and selves, and how this can in turn serve as a neo-liberal tool for normalizing
and governing marginalized populations. Thus, the goal of this article is not to glorify or to
sanitize pleasure, but to nevertheless advocate for its intrinsic value and its potentially positive
productive effects. For further discussion of the limits of pleasure see generally Michel
Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley
(New York: Random House, 1985). For a discussion of how “acceptable bodily pleasure” has
historically been accessible only by those deemed reasonable, responsible, productive and
‘good’ see Pat O’Malley, P & Mariana Valverde, “Pleasure, Freedom and Drugs: The Uses of
‘Pleasure’ in Liberal Governance of Drug and Alcohol Consumption” 38 Soc 25.
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against its risks, Canadian courts should consider adopting both a positive
rights framework—one that balances the body’s needs to be free from abuse
and exploitation with its need for health and pleasure—as well as a sex-positive
legal framework—one that considers the intrinsic value of sexual pleasure and
which factors the relevance of sexual pleasure into legal determinations of
constitutionally protected speech.205
To date, the legal regulation of sex and sexual expression primarily seeks to
ensure freedom from sexual insecurity, rather than the freedom to access sexual
information and freedom to experience desired sexual pleasure and expression.
This positive rights approach has found greater acceptance in global sexual
and reproductive health policy than in obscenity law, and could better inform
interpretations of the private use exception and its parameters.206 For instance,
according to the World Association for Sexual Health (WAS), there is a “growing
awareness and understanding that ‘pleasure and prevention’ go hand in hand”
and that “[s]exual health promotion programs for all groups, including youth
and people with disabilities, should embody the reality that sexual pleasure and
intimacy are strong motivating factors for sexual behavior [including sexual
expression] and that sexual pleasure contributes to happiness and well-being.”207
The WAS Declaration of Sexual Rights thus considers physical, psychological,
intellectual, and spiritual value of sex and sexual pleasure and advocates for
service providers to recognize the harms of abstinence [and implicitly criminal]
responses to youth sexuality.208 Moreover, WAS declares that sexual rights are
integral to universal human rights and enumerates all peoples’ rights to sexual
pleasure, emotional sexual expression, and the right to associate freely. Sexual
expression here is defined as the “right to express [one’s] sexuality through
communication, touch, emotional expression and love.”209

205. For more on the intrinsic value of sexual pleasure see: Michel Foucault, The History of
Sexuality (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Gayle Rubin “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” in Carol Vance, ed, Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female
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NYU L Rev 89 at 150.
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Technical Document (Minneapolis: World Association for Sexual Health, 2008).
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Legal and political scholars have argued that a positive rights framework
should be extended to youth210 and to youths’ digital sexual expression,211 and that
the latter right be extended despite the impossibility of complete privacy in the
digital age. Albury, for example, argues that youths’ digital sexual rights cannot be
“contingent on complete privacy since the capacity for ‘spreadability’ (or copying
and sharing) is an intrinsic aspect of contemporary digital culture. ... For adults to
insist that young people only have sexual rights where they are assured of absolute
privacy can, therefore, be seen as a de facto demand for digital non-participation
or abstinence.”212 While, as Planned Parenthood notes, “[p]ublic discourse about
the physiological and psychosocial health benefits of sexual expression has been
almost entirely absent,”213 there is a growing body of research “demonstrating
that sexual expression may have health benefits for improving quality of life and
self-esteem and for reducing stress, depression and suicide.”214
The relevance of a sex-positive, pleasure acknowledging, legal framework for
conceptualizing and responding to youths’ digital sexual expression is further
reinforced by Kaplan’s critique of the devaluing of sexual pleasure in “several areas
of law central to how we experience sex and sexual pleasure” such as obscenity
laws. She argues that “accepting the premise that sexual pleasure has intrinsic
value challenges the organizing principles of these areas of law and requires
us to reexamine our approach to them.”215 Criminal censure of youths’ digital
expression, would thus require the courts to weigh the risk of the harm occurring,
the severity of the harm, and the cost of prohibiting the activity. This cost would
more adequately factor in sexual pleasure for pleasures sake (as it does with other
speech acts, such as humour, literature, and art), in addition to the role that this
pleasure plays in youths’ self-actualization, fulfillment, and development of their
identity.216 As Kaplan argues, “Recognizing and appreciating the value of sexual
210. Rosalind Petchesky, “Sexual Rights: Inventing a Concept, Mapping an International Practice”
in Rosalind Parker, Regina Maria Barbosa & Peter Aggleton, eds, Framing the Sexual
Subject: The Politics of Gender, Sexuality and Power (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000) 81 at 93.
211. Albury, supra note 181 at 716.
212. Ibid.
213. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, “The Health Benefits of Sexual Expression,”
White Paper (2007), online: <http://www.plannedparenthood.org>.
214. Ibid.
215. See Kaplan, supra note 205 at 92. Notably, for Kaplan, “sexual pleasure” is not limited to
physical sexual relations but rather refers to ‘physical and psychological enjoyment that is
interpreted as sexual or erotic by the individual experiencing it. Ibid at 94.
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pleasure enriches our ability to regulate activities that affect said pleasure because
it requires legislatures and courts to be honest about the trade-offs associated with
proposed regulation and interference. It yields a more complete assessment of
the true harms and benefits of the activity we seek to regulate.”217 The failure to
recognize the applicability of a positive rights, and sex-positive legal framework
for judicial assessments of youths’ digital sexual expression thus distorts the
calculus of its harms. Accepting the premise that adolescents are sexual and that
sexual pleasure and sexual expression has as much intrinsic value for them as it
does for adults allows us to better acknowledge that a range of adolescent porn,
like much adult porn, is not obscene and unconstitutional—even if it is not fully
controlled or maintained as private.
A more accurate calculation of the harms of teenage sexting also requires
a more careful analysis of whether the loss of control of one’s sexual images
poses a reasoned risk of harm to other children. Prevalence rates are helpful
here. While teenage sexting rates demonstrate the practices is relatively common
and on the increase, research indicates that there has been a large decline in
child sexual abuse from 1992 to 2010, post the development of Web 2.0 and
user generated content.218 Similar trends are noted in the United Kingdom.219
In the United States, studies show that a very small proportion of sex offences
against children (under 2 per cent) had an online component.220 The studies on
online sex offending show that most online offenders are persons who know their
victims from offline contexts, like school or church, and that the dynamics of
online and offline offenders are similar.221 With respect to the Court’s concern
in Sharpe about the use of sexual images to: fuel cognitive distortions about
children as appropriate sexual partners; groom children for sexual abuse; fuel
fantasies of pedophiles; and contribute to the market for child pornography,
again these concerns make more sense when there are large differences in age
between those in the images, as well as the presence of exploitation and abuse.
Moreover, as other legal scholars have argued, the harm that stems from the
illicit circulation of consensually produced sexts is different from the harm that
217. Kaplan, supra note 205 at 151.
218. National Children’s Advocacy Center, Declining Rates of Child Sexual Abuse: A Bibliography
(2011) at 1-11, online: <www.nationalcac.org>.
219. Lorraine Radford et al, Child Abuse and Neglect in the UK Today (National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 2011).
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arises via the circulation of child pornography.222 Finally, concerns about sexting’s
impact on the market for child pornography are overstated:
In both contexts, the market is usually a secretive enclave, closed to all except for
members of an in-group. However, there are social and technological differences
between the two markets. For child pornographers, the in-group is pedophiles,
hebephiles, or people with an interest in deviant/paraphilic pornographic material.
The market is global and is accessed primarily through anonymizing network
routing processes. For youths who sext, the market typically comprises peers from
schools or youth programs and is usually limited to local friends. The exchanges
predominantly occur over cellular networks, directly through texting, or via various
messaging applications…Because of the relative size and technological savviness of
youths who sext, illicit markets tend to be small and are shut down easily relative
to child pornography markets. There is little, if any, evidence demonstrating that
the two markets ever intersect. Thus, the likely longevity of the harm in the two
scenarios is also different. 223

VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates the myriad ways in which the technological, social,
sexual, and legal landscape has changed since Sharpe was decided in 2001. Offline
and online are no longer considered separate and distinct realms that map neatly
onto real/fake sex or legitimate/illegitimate sexual expression.224 An intimate,
sexually exploratory exchange between young people is now at least as likely to
occur across networks of fibre optics as it is in parked cars. In this context, the
consensual creation and sharing of digital sexual images with a crush, long-term
partner, or even a complete stranger can serve, for some, as a modern-day love
letter, flirting, or foreplay. For others, sexting is a precursor to offline sex or
understood as the practice of safe(r) sex, with a host of benefits and a degree of
risk, as is the case with off-line sex and expression. Indeed, as research on teenage
sexting reveals, the creation and distribution of digital sexual images is the new
norm for many.
These fundamental shifts, it has been argued, have had significant
implications for the scope of the private use exception and its applicability to
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youths’ digital sexual expression.225 More recent interpretations of the exception
have expanded the definition of “participant” and recognized the role of “digital
sharing” in our contemporary digital context. This, along with legislative
rationales for Canada’s new intimate images provisions, has effectively expanded
the exception’s parameters and extended its applicability to youths’ digitally
self-created and consensually transmitted pornography.226 However this right has
also been constrained by judicial decisions requiring that youth maintain the
ability to control their images, a near impossibility in the digital age.
Youths’ lack of control over their sexual images has, unfortunately, been
addressed in Canada via the application of child pornography laws. However,
even in instances where the sexual image of a youth is redistributed without
their consent, courts have recognized that the loss of privacy experienced by the
individual is “a very different issue than what was before the Court in Sharpe.”227
In R v MB for example, a sixteen-year-old girl was convicted of distributing child
porn after she shared an image of her boyfriend’s ex-girlfriend with her best
friend via a cellphone and with the ex-girlfriend via a private Facebook message.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal later found that the trial judge had erred
when they dismissed M.B.’s submission “that cell phones with cameras did not
exist when Sharpe was decided, and that the Court could not have foreseen the
frequency with which adolescents take and share sexual photos of themselves.”228
This case was heard before the new intimate images laws came into effect and the
conviction is currently under appeal.
With these developments comes the urgent need for judicial or legislative
clarification of the private use exception. This may come in the form of an
appeal; the enumeration of a consensual “sexting” defence to Canada’s child
pornography provisions; or via a redrafting and narrowing of the definition of
child pornography in the code so that it captures only those images that stem
from the sexual abuse and exploitation of an actual child. At the very least,
child advocates such as the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, federal and
provincial policing agencies, and future courts need to be made aware of these
developments so that they can avoid infringing on youths’ constitutional rights.
For instance, in April of 2019 Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada,
David Lametti, announced additional funding in excess of $77,000 to support
225. For consideration of “fundamental shifts” on the parameters of legal debates, see Canada
(AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para 42.
226. R v Keough, supra note 20.
227. R v MB, 2016 BCCA 476 at para 27.
228. Ibid at para 28.
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an anti-sexting campaign that inaccurately describes the consensual creation of
teenage sexting as “self-exploitation” and as criminal.229 Additional concerns exist
regarding the improper application of extra-judicial measures to youth (such as
forced participation in criminal diversion programs where no crimes have been
committed) or the charging of youth with child pornography provisions in
instances of “intimate image” distribution, as seen with the recent charging of
a fourteen-year-old Winnipeg boy with child pornography offences.230 Teaching
youth they do not have to right to digital sexual expression or charging them
as child pornographers in non-consensual distribution cases distorts not only
our perceptions of young people’s sexuality and sexual expression, but also our
understanding of child pornography as a legal category. Ultimately, we need to be
more creative and respond to violations of trust and privacy in a more measured
and extra-legal manner, even if these violations deeply offend or cause relational,
emotional, and economic distress.
Moving forward, policing agencies, child advocates, and the courts should
better consider Article 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child which states that “the child shall have the right to freedom of expression”
and that this “includes through any other media of the child’s choice.”231
Of course, as Alisdair Gillespie notes, this right must be read in conjunction with
other articles such as Article 3(c) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which requires “‘as a minimum’ that producing, distributing,
disseminating ... child pornography constitutes a criminal offence,”232 as well as
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which finds that “all
forms of expression are capable of protection,” and which proclaims that any
overruling of this guarantee must be “proportionate.”233 The evidence provided
throughout this article suggests that the application of child pornography laws
with regard to consensual, as well as most non-consensual distribution contexts,
does not adequately and proportionately respond to youths’ digital sexual speech,
229. Department of Justice Canada, “Government of Canada Supports Initiatives to Fight
Youth Exploitation” (15 April 2019), Newswire, online: <www.newswire.ca/news-releases/
government-of-canada-supports-initiatives-to-fight-youth-exploitation-864077241.html>.
230. Jason Gaidola, “Teen Facing Child Porn Charges” (18 March 2019), CTV News, online:
<www.winnipeg.ctvnews.ca/teen-facing-child-porn-charges-1.4340818>.
231. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force
2 September 1990), Art 13.
232. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 25 May 2000, UN Doc
A/54/49 (2000).
233. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), Art 10.
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even to their malicious speech. Future calculations of the affordances and harms
of youths’ digital sexual expression require a more progressive and nuanced
analysis of shifting privacy and communication norms, as well as a sex-positive
analysis of the value of sexual pleasure for youth and the role of digital technology
in their contemporary social and sexual relations.

